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ABSTRACT
For the past thirty years there has been an ongoing debate regarding the nature of
the Early Modern European Military Revolution. Much of this debate centers around
whether the military and technological changes which are at the heart of the military
revolution created the conditions for the bureaucratic systems of the modern nation state,
or if those bureaucratic systems made possible the creation of larger, state sponsored
armies and navies, as well as when these changes took place. Instead of focusing on what
came first, the chicken or the egg, this thesis explores one aspect of the Military
Revolution, focusing on the works of Sebastian le Prestre de Vauban who invented the
socket bayonet, refined and systematized the practice of siege warfare, and emphasized
the importance of the lives of his men. These changes are fundamental to understanding
not only how wars were fought, but also how war affected those that fought them during
this pivotal period of European history.
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INTRODUCTION
With Popes Innocent VIII and Alexander VI urging him to lay claim to the vacant
throne of the Kingdom of Naples, Charles VIII, King of France, mustered an army of
25,000, and marched them into Italy. Among this force were 8,000 Swiss mercenaries,
and as many as forty new artillery pieces. Crossing the border in September of 1494,
Charles’ army reached Pisa by November 8th, Florence by November 17th, and Rome by
December 31st. By February 8th, 1494, the army encamped near the town of Monte San
Giovanni, the northern-most outpost of the Kingdom of Naples. While it was a fortified
town, it was best remembered as being the place where Thomas Aquinas was imprisoned
by his family, to attempt to dissuade him from joining the Dominicans.
The 11th-century castle which protected Monte San Giovanni had been besieged
many times before. With a garrison of a thousand men, it had once been besieged for
seven years without falling. It was with this history in mind that the defenders refused the
demands for surrender. To make sure their refusal could not be misconstrued, the
defenders killed the French envoys, mutilated their bodies, and sent their corpses back to
the French lines.
The next day, Charles arrayed his forty new artillery pieces before the walls of
Monte San Giovanni, with the rest of the army drawn up to assault the place once
breaches in the walls were made. While neighboring Monte Fortino surrendered as soon
as the French artillery were in place, Monte San Giovanni would not be given that same
honor. After the smoke cleared from the first volley, noticeable cracks in the city’s stout
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walls were visible from the French lines. The gunners used those cracks as targets,
spewing cast-iron cannonballs from eight-foot-long bronze cannons at an astonishing
rate. Soon the walls of the castle were rubble, and the French army advanced while the
gunners continued to bombard the town. Eight hours after the first gun fired, Monte San
Giovanni, a city that had once withstood a siege for seven years, was in ruins, the
inhabitants and garrison who survived the bombardment all put to the sword. In the face
of such swift violence the rest of the Kingdom of Naples fell to Charles VIII without even
having to arrange his artillery.
While sieges were common, and massacres even more so, the swiftness with
which Charles VIII conquered the Italian peninsula, the rapidity with which previously
unassailable fortresses fell, represents a revolutionary shift in how European wars were
fought. Using cast-iron cannonballs, and long, thin cast-bronze cannons, the supremacy
of defense, which stood since builders began building fortifications from stone,
disappeared. In the course of those eight hours nearly every fortification in Europe was
obsolete. The fall of Monte San Giovanni signaled the beginnings of an Early Modern
European Military Revolution.
For more than thirty years, the academic community has been embroiled in an
acrimonious debate concerning the Early Modern European Military Revolution. The
reason for this enmity arises from how central these ideas have been to the careers of
some of these scholars. For centuries prior to this Revolution, European armies were
assembled using a feudal model, with kings calling upon lesser nobles who owed them
allegiance, to fill out the ranks of the army. In turn these lesser nobles called on others
who owed them allegiance, to fill their quotas of spearmen, archers, and cavalry. The
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advent of the Revolution changed this, with feudal men at arms and their obligations
replaced by peasant conscripts trained by the state to fight for pay.
The prevailing arguments around how and why these changes were made fall into
two competing schools of thought. The first of these is the “Roberts-Parker” camp, that
argues for technological determinism, with gunpowder artillery, linear infantry tactics,
and new fortifications changing how armies fought during the Early Modern period, and
the importance of individuals to this revolution, namely Maurice of Orange, and Gustav
Adolf of Sweden. The “other” camp argues against revolution, instead describing it as
gradual evolution involving changes to infantry, artillery, fortification, small-arms, and
finally naval power, utilizing a wider dating of events to describe these changes. Both
camps agree that there are significant differences between how wars were fought before
these events occurred and after.
Instead of positioning myself in one camp or another, I propose a different
definition. My solution takes the technological aspects of Roberts-Parker (angled bastion
fortifications and the artillery needed to take them, as well as the introduction of the
socket bayonet) and places them within a different chronological framework (16601760). My model will, like the Roberts’ original, focus on individuals, but places them
within a later time frame presenting Sebastian le Prestre de Vauban as the embodiment of
this military revolution.
Vauban’s life and work are key to understanding my interpretation of the Early
Modern European Military Revolution. His invention of the socket bayonet allowed
infantry armed with gunpowder weapons to defend themselves against cavalry, which
previously was the battlefield roll of pikemen. His development of parallel siege trenches,
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the perfection of “ricochet batteries”, and a systematic approach to siege warfare were
essential to preserving the lives of the men under his command. This focus on preserving
the lives of French soldiers is the most revolutionary aspect of Vauban’s legacy.
But in focusing on Vauban and his legacy, there requires an examination of his
motivations. Part of a family of clerks and notaries, Vauban did not have formal military
training, instead receiving an education at the Carmelite college at Semur-en-Auxois. He
gave his life wholly to the preservation of the French state, tirelessly devoting himself to
fortifying its borders, and protecting the soldiers in its employ. And while he is mostly
remembered today as a fortifier of places, in his day and to military tacticians and
engineers during subsequent centuries, he was best known for his achievements on the
battlefield. By focusing on his written words, and these tactics which shifted the balance
of the battlefield from the defensive to the offensive, it will be possible to bring harmony
to this otherwise acrimonious debate. This, in turn, will increase “our understanding of
the role war played in the development of the early modern state.” 1
To prove the validity of my model for military revolution, Vauban’s contribution
to military theory and the practice of siege engineering will be examined. The Early
Modern European Military Revolution elevated the siege as the dominant form of warfare
amongst European Powers. His contemporaries, as well as later scholars, considered
Vauban to be the ultimate practitioner of this new siege warfare. The only way to gain an
understanding of his ideas is to examine his most famous written work: A Manual of
Siegecraft and Fortification, written after his retirement from active military service in

1

Jamel Ostwald, Vauban Under Siege: Engineering Efficiency and Martial Vigor in the War of Spanish
Succession (Boston: University of Leiden Press, 2007), 19.
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1705. This is a continuation of his previous works, Traité des sièges et d’attaque des
places and Traité de la défense des places, all of which describe the various means by
which a fortified place might be taken or defended.
I contend that Vauban’s siege tactics, as contained in A Manual of Siegecraft and
Fortification, serve as the benchmark against which all subsequent military actions will
be judged. They mark the beginning of this military revolution. One individual, Vauban,
served as the “tipping point” for revolution, as Roberts, Parker, and their supporters
maintain, but his contributions came later than the periodization common to the RobertsParker camp, as their critics in the “other” camp argue. The real “tipping point” is the
idea that the lives of men were a valuable resource and needed to be shepherded, and
could be protected by use of the socket bayonet, and these improved siege techniques.
With Vauban’s words in hand I will compare his words to accounts of his actions.
This is similar to the approach taken by Jamel Ostwald in his 2007 book Vauban Under
Siege: Engineering Efficiency and Martial Vigor in the War of Spanish Succession. To
differentiate my work from his, I will examine siegecraft during the Seven Years War in
North America. I do this not only to distance myself from Ostwald’s work on the War of
Spanish Succession, but to also shine further light on a conflict that is often
overshadowed by the American Revolution, a conflict that can rightly be described as the
last major European conflict of the Early Modern Period. Like Ostwald, however, I will
use Vauban’s successful 1697 siege of Ath as the touchstone for my observations of later
sieges.
The sieges in North America that I examine are the 1757 siege of Fort William
Henry, the 1758 unsuccessful siege of Fort Carillon (Ticonderoga) and its seizure in
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1759, as well as the 1759 siege of Fort Niagara. These represent a good sampling of both
French and English actions, while representing examples of both victories and defeats.
And I would be remiss not to include Fort Niagara, since my visit there in 2016 inspired
my research into this topic. Once I outline the events of these sieges, I will compare the
actions of the various commanders: the Marquis de Montcalm, Major General James
Abercromby, General Jeffery Amherst, and Colonel John Prideaux to Vauban’s
description of how a siege should be undertaken.
To demonstrate the superiority of Vauban’s methods, I use documentary
evidence. In addition to A Manual of Siegecraft and Fortification, Louis Goulon, a
French engineer, provided an eyewitness account of the siege of Ath, which I use as
proof of Vauban’s concept. The noted French naturalist and explorer, Louis de
Bougainville left his journal recording his involvement with Montcalm during the attack
on Fort William Henry and the defense of Fort Carillon. Pierre Pouchot, commanding the
French garrison at Fort Niagara, left an account of how the French defended the fortress,
and how he saw the English conducting their siege.
In chapter 1, I discuss the historiography of the military revolution. Chapter 2
gives my new, differing view of the military revolution and introduces Vauban while
discussing the revolutionary nature of his contributions. Chapter 3 covers the 1697 siege
of Ath and a broad overview of Vauban’s writings. Chapter 4 looks at the 1757 French
action at Fort William Henry, the 1758 British assault on Fort Carillion, its seizure in
1759, and the 1759 British victory at Fort Niagara. Chapter 5 will tie these ideas together
as well as give ideas for further research.

7

CHAPTER ONE: SO YOU SAY YOU WANT A REVOLUTION
The “Early Modern European Military Revolution” is best described as a series of
changes to how European militaries conducted warfare during the Early Modern period
(1453-1798). 2 This includes changes to infantry tactics, the integration of gunpowder
artillery and hand-held firearms, fortress design and construction, and naval warfare.
Some have described these changes as revolutionary, while others have not. In citing
Stephen Jay Gould and Niles Eldridge’s evolutionary theory of “punctuated equilibrium”
to describe his own place in this conversation, Clifford Rogers argues that, “this newer
concept of punctuated equilibrium evolution, combining both incremental and
‘revolutionary’ change, seems to describe the process of military innovation
extraordinarily well.” 3 But by “attempting to subsume the innovations of five centuries
into a single phenomenon, we may be imposing an artificial technological unity onto a
series of inherently distinct, separate developments.” 4 This means that although hindsight
supports the idea of an Early Modern European Military Revolution, it should be viewed

2

To clarify, the Early-modern Military Revolution is not the same as the “Revolution in Military Affairs”
or RMA. The fundamental difference between the Military revolution and the RMA is intent. The
discussion surrounding the Military Revolution is academic in nature, discussing the past for its own sake.
The RMA uses academic discourse as a base, that is then put through a theoretical framework, developed in
the Soviet Union, to discover the next sudden change in how wars will be fought, to predict the course of
events, and thereby gain an advantage. Thus, the discussion of the Military Revolution deals exclusively
with the past, the RMA uses the past to predict the future.
3
Clifford J. Rogers, “The Military Revolutions of the Hundred Years War” in The Military Revolution
Debate: Readings on the Military Transformation of Early Modern Europe, ed. Clifford J. Rogers, (New
York: Westview Press, 1995), 77. Introduced in 1972, the theory of “punctuated equilibrium evolution”
argues that biological evolutionary changes come as a result of sudden bursts of rapid change, followed by
long periods of “near stasis” rather than by constant, slow change over time.
4
Ibid.
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as a strictly academic exercise. This is because people involved in past events would have
been unaware how their actions would be construed by future generations.
This chapter will discuss historiographic trends and arguments regarding the Early
Modern European Military Revolution. Originally the Military Revolution was described
as changes in infantry tactics that allowed for larger armies which precipitated
absolutism. This was later revised to include advances in the design of fortifications
which created larger armies, and that these changes are what caused absolutism. Further
arguments stated that medieval changes in army composition allowed for larger armies
which provided the conditions that allowed absolutism to flourish. This idea, that armies
increased in size has come under question, as well as when these changes occurred. With
each phase of this debate, new aspects have been examined, and as new information
comes to light, and new sources are examined, each wave of historians build from, and
refute, the ideas that have come before.
The concept originates with Michael Roberts. In a lecture given at Queen’s
University in Belfast in 1955, he argues that military developments of a technical nature
exerted a lasting influence on society at large. In the simplest terms, these technical
advances, which include the development of personal firearms, led to tactical
innovations. These technical and tactical developments were both agents and auxiliaries
of social change. According to Roberts, the originators of this military revolution sought
to implement linear tactical solutions, which promised to provide victory over the
combined forces of the Hapsburgs, by standardizing and economizing the training of
large numbers of individual foot soldiers. Roberts states, “the soldier of the Middle Ages
had been … highly trained over a prolonged period. The coming, first of firearms … put
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an end to this state of affairs. The mercenary in the middle of a pike square needed little
training and less skill.” 5 So instead of small armies composed of men who spent their
entire lives training for war on horseback, fighting out of obligation to their feudal lords,
they were replaced by large numbers of men trained for a couple of months armed with
pikes and guns, fighting exclusively on foot and for pay. Warfare was no longer the
exclusive purview of the nobility,
By Roberts’ admission, the originators of the military revolution, were Maurice of
Orange, and Gustav Adolf, king of Sweden, “under the inspiration of Vegetius, Aelian,
and Leo the Isaurian.” 6 Roberts argues, “in place of the massive, deep, unwieldy squares
of the Spanish tercio, or the still larger but more irregular blocks of the Swiss column,
they relied on a multiplicity of small units ranged in two or three lines, and so disposed
and armed to permit the full exploitation of all types of weapon.” 7 While Maurice used
these tactical changes on the defensive, Gustav Adolf applied them “with brilliant success
in offensive actions too.” 8
But in order to accomplish this, officers were needed, in order to drill the men,
conforming their will to that of their commanders. While the armies of the medieval
period had commanders and chains of command, those chains were forged from the iron
of feudal obligation, with each fighter bedecked in their own livery, trying to make a
name for themselves on the battlefield. “The army was no longer to be a brute mass, in

5

Michael Roberts, “The Military Revolution, 1560-1660” in The Military Revolution Debate: Readings on
the Military Transformation of Early Modern Europe, ed. Clifford Rogers, (New York: Westview Press,
1995), 14.
6
Ibid, 13-14.
7
Ibid, 14. The most important of these weapons would be firearms, but Roberts would leave it to other
historians to emphasize this point.
8
Ibid.
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the Swiss style, nor a collection of bellicose individuals, in the feudal style; it was to be
an articulated organism of which each part responded to impulses from above.” 9 This
could be done by issuing uniforms, which would create cohesion within the army, and by
creating a local army, composed entirely of soldiers fighting for pay. However this
change created more problems than it solved.
Roberts writes that while Machiavelli argues for local militias, these small, local
units made up of part-time soldiers were unable to master the modern arts of war.
Additionally, most European monarchs were unwilling to grant the lower orders of
society training in arms, for fear of what might be. This led to the rise of an international
mercenary culture, best exemplified by the flamboyant German landsknecht, that would
be overshadowed by the Roman inspired forces of Maurice of Orange during the Eighty
Years’ War, and the Swedish peasant conscripts wielded by Gustav Adolf during the
Thirty Years’ War. With these tactical revolutions, Roberts specifies two types of
strategic revolution as well. One of these is based solely on the offensive, the idea being
that battles between armies were the only way for conflicts to be resolved. The second
was based on the gradual conquest of territory. Both would necessitate larger, longer
standing, national armies.
According to Roberts, these tactical and strategic revolutions helped usher in large
permanent armies, which helped create absolute monarchies. He states, “where
absolutism triumphed in this century, it did so because it provided the response to a
genuine need; and though an army might be useful for curbing aristocratic license, it was
but an accessory factor in the general political situation which produced the eclipse of the

9

Ibid, 15.
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Estates.” 10 These monarchies created new administrations. These sought to solve military
problems by standardizing equipment, which promised to reduce costs. This, in turn,
helped to solve the problem of paying for larger, better equipped armies. This led to the
armies becoming the property of the monarch, which would have unforeseen social
consequences.
These consequences would include the leveling of the social playing field. War
was no longer the exclusive purview of the nobility. The poor could go to war and use it
as a vehicle for social mobility. He states that “the new armies, in fact, served as the
social escalators of the age; the eternal wars favoured interstratic mobility; and for a
young man with some capital behind him a regiment could be a brilliant investment:
Wallhausen lamented that war was ceasing to be an honourable profession, and was
becoming a mere traffic.” 11
The arts of war went from being something a soldier had to dedicate their whole
lives to, to something they could learn, by rote instruction, from a book, in a much shorter
amount of time. For this purpose, nations established military academies, to train and
instruct a new piece of the battlefield puzzle: the officer. This instruction in the arts of
war cemented a clear divide between the military and civilian worlds. As such, the old
rites of loot and plunder, rapine and slaughter, needed to be restricted, with the State
maintaining a monopoly on violence. This would result in well-fortified frontiers, as well
as codes of conduct established in the wake of the violence of the Thirty Years’ War that
would try to limit the destruction of legitimate war.

10
11

Ibid, 18.
Ibid, 23.
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For nearly twenty years, Roberts’ theory remained unquestioned. But in 1976,
Geoffrey Parker, writing his dissertation about the Spanish Army in Flanders, expressed
his doubts about some of the tenets of Roberts’ ideas. He recounts that “with that grim
humor for which academics are famous, the History Faculty Board of Cambridge
University appointed Michael Roberts as my external examiner … Much to my surprise,
however, that generous and gracious man told me that he found my critique convincing
and advised me to publish it separately as an article.” 12 The article, entitled “The
‘Military Revolution, 1560-1660’ – A Myth?” while agreeing with the idea that a military
revolution took place, disagreed with more than just the start date. According to Parker,
“Many of the developments described by Roberts also characterized warfare in
Renaissance Italy … the French, German, Swiss, and Spanish invaders had to adopt the
methods of the condottieri, both in attack and defense, before they could make real
headway against them.” 13
While Roberts emphasizes the tactical reforms of Maurice and Gustav, Parker
downplays their importance. He writes that these men were both forced to rethink their
tactics and reshape their armies due to defeats suffered at the hands of better trained and
equipped Hapsburg forces. Parker notes, “the Spanish army … was a force of impressive
military efficiency.” 14 Ten years prior to Roberts’ start date, the Spanish army in Flanders
had already gained notoriety for relying on the relatively new arquebus. Fernando
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Geoffrey Parker, “In Defense of the Military Revolution” in The Military Revolution Debate: Readings
on the Military Transformation of Early Modern Europe, ed. Clifford Rogers, (New York: Westview Press,
1995), 337.
13
Geoffrey Parker, “The ‘Military Revolution’ – A Myth?” in The Military Revolution Debate: Readings
on the Military Transformation of Early Modern Europe, ed. Clifford Rogers, (New York: Westview Press,
1995), 38-39.
14
Ibid. 39.
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Álvarez de Toledo, the notorious Duke of Alva added musketeers to his infantry
companies during the 1550s, and by the 1570s “there were at least two companies which
consisted solely of shot in every tercio on active service.” 15
Roberts viewed the Eighty Years’ and Thirty Years’ Wars as exhibiting the first
“national” armies, Parker observes that permanent or semi-permanent armies existed
prior to that, during the dynastic conflicts between England and France, known as the
Hundred Years War. This near constant state of war, over such a long period of time,
produced “standing armies, greater professionalism among the troops, improvements in
military organization, and certain tactical innovations.” 16 Of more importance than any
perceived tactical innovation was technological innovation.
According to Parker, the most important technical innovation, and the real
keystone of the military revolution was “the appearance of an entirely new type of
defensive fortification: the trace italienne, a circuit of low, thick walls, punctuated by
quadrilateral bastions. In the course of the fifteenth century it became obvious that
improvements in gun founding and artillery had rendered the high, thin walls of the
Middle Ages quite indefensible.” 17 He cites Ferdinand and Isabella’s conquest of
Granada and Charles VII’s seizure of English possessions in France as examples.
Parker notes that military architects in Italy were the first to develop this new
style of fortification, Italy having more cities than any other region in Europe. This new
fortification style, which will be discussed in more detail below, meant that cities could
not be quickly battered into submission. Without adequate artillery support, the only way

15

Ibid.
Ibid, 40.
17
Ibid, 41.
16
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to reduce a city was to surround it and starve the inhabitants. The only way to raise such a
siege would be for an outside force to relieve them, and it was in these rescuing actions
that battles took place, like the 1525 Battle of Pavia, where Charles V defeated Francois
I, and the 1683 Battle of Vienna, where the Polish hussars under Jan III Sobieski routed
the Ottomans. Parker sees sieges as being more important than battles, because
“whenever wars happened to occur in areas where the trace italienne was absent … then
battles were both frequent and important.” 18
While Parker disagrees with Roberts regarding certain aspects of the military
revolution, the strategic and tactical aspects, as well as the dates, there is one point where
they agree. “There is absolutely no doubt about its third constituent: the growth of army
size. Between 1530 and 1710 there was a ten-fold increase both in the total numbers of
armed forces paid by the major European states and in the total numbers involved in the
major European battles.” 19 To explain this dramatic increase, Parker contrasts medieval
armies with those of the early modern period. He states that heavy cavalry, armored men
on horseback delivering a crouched lance blow at the gallop, were the backbone of
European medieval armies. The heavy cavalry dominated, until “it was discovered that a
heavy cavalry charge could regularly be stopped either by volleys of arrows or by a forest
of pikes.” 20
He argues that while, economically, there was a limit to how many heavily
armored men and horses were available to a given commander, “there was none to the
number of ordinary men who could be enlisted and issued a pike, sword, and helmet. A

18

Ibid, 42.
Ibid, 43.
20
Ibid, 44.
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pike-man’s basic equipment cost little more than his wages for a week, and in some cases
even this paltry sum could be deducted from the soldier’s pay.” 21 And, thus, armies could
receive more “bang for their buck” by employing large numbers of foot soldiers, who
would be trained in a manner consistent with Roberts’ thesis.
But accomplishing the dream of mass mobilization required administrative and
financial innovations. Describing the necessities to feed an army of 50,000, Parker claims
that, “only in the later sixteenth century did it become possible to meet these basic human
needs on a grand scale.” 22 This was only possible due to increases in governmental
revenues, raised with new modes of taxation. This further forced states to develop more
complex bureaucracies, because only the financial resources of a larger entity could
continue to pay for and equip such a large force. Echoing Roberts’ prior esteem for the
works of Maurice of Orange, Parker describes the manner in which the Dutch approached
international trade and finance, describing it as being the only way to keep an army in the
field for so long with so few disruptions. This system was so successful, he states, that it
was soon emulated throughout Europe, allowing any nation of sufficient economic
strength to field a sizeable army.
Parker notes, though, that this military revolution had its limits. He notes that
while there was an increase in military manpower, there were operational and logistical
limits that needed to be addressed before European armies could reach the numbers seen
during the revolutionary wars of the late eighteenth/early nineteenth centuries. But he
punctuates this by stating that this surge in the number of men engaged in warfare,
had all the significant consequences which Roberts attributed to it: it made

21
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Ibid.
Ibid, 46.
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war impinge more on society; it increased the authority of the state (partly
at the expense of the citizen); it accentuated social mobility; and it
undoubtedly retarded the economic development of most participants
(although it stimulated that of many neutrals) … The ‘prodigious increase
in the scale of warfare’ alone merits the title of ‘military revolution’ which
Roberts bestowed upon it. 23
While Parker and Roberts were trying to “connect the dots” between military
revolution and the rise of absolutism, others focused on describing the change in the way
European armies fought each other for its own sake. Michael Howard, deviates from
Roberts’ description of an Early Modern European military revolution. In his best-selling
War in European History, he describes the infantry-heavy armies and better gunpowder
artillery 24 that allowed France, under Charles VIII to swiftly batter down almost every
fortification he encountered during the Italian War of 1494-98, forcing citadels to fall in
days where they had previously taken months or even years to capitulate. The infantry, in
this case, were based on the successful Swiss pike blocks, which would soon be copied
throughout Western Europe.
By the end of the fifteenth century, Howard argues, pikemen, accompanied by
men armed with the arquebus, represented the core of every infantry force. These men,
and those that plied the artillery, represent a revolutionary advancement of the art of war.
Instead of engaging in warfare out of feudal obligation, and hoping to be “taken into
Royal service on a permeant basis,” the men fighting under Charles VIII were doing so in
order to receive payment from the state. 25 Thus, the army the French king took to Italy, a
mixture of Swiss pikemen, French cavalry, and bronze cannons, all of whom were either

23
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As compared to torsion siege engines, catapults, trebuchets, and other non-gunpowder artillery.
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Michael Howard, War in European History, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976), 18.
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paid wages by, or in the case of the cannons, paid for by the state, constitutes the first,
modern, European army.
Howard argues, though, that the wars fought by these modern armies were of a
decidedly medieval character, with kings and nobles trying to exert their will onto other
kings and nobles. These were not wars of national liberation, nor were they wars dictated
by the passions of religion. But warfare in Europe would also be carried out by “an
international class of contractors on a purely commercial basis.” 26 Unlike their medieval
counterparts, these contractors saw their armies as resources to be shepherded, and so
large scale, formal battles became much less frequent.
As a result of improved fortifications, increased firepower, and a “cautious
professional competence” sieges replaced field battles as the main work of European
armies. 27 Howard delves into the tactical organization that so fascinated Roberts and
Parker, placing himself squarely in their camp. He describes the shift from having one
arquebus to every ten pikes employed by the Spanish tercio, described by Parker, to a
one-to-six ratio among the armies of Gustav Adolf, highlighted by Roberts. To this
discussion of tactical reorganization, he includes in wholesale adoption of the bastioned
trace (angled bastions or trace italianne).
This new style of fortification included the lowering and thickening of
fortification walls, and the inclusion of artillery, in a counter-battery role. Howard extolls
the virtue of the later engineering systems of Vauban and van Coehorn, seen to be the
pinnacle of the style, explaining that this new style of fortification was more resistant to
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assault. More time was needed to reduce an angled bastion than the tall, stone walls of
medieval fortifications, and this led to the spade being introduced to the infantryman’s
kit, as trenches and gunpowder mines needed to be excavated for these fortified positions
to be taken.

Figure 1

Illustration by Lillian Green

But of far greater significance than the spade were improvements to gunpowder
artillery. And it is this, Howard argues, that allows Europeans to be able to force their
will on peoples throughout the rest of the world. 28 This is the first time this observation
would be made, but certainly not the last. These artillery pieces would be placed on
bastioned fortresses, not only in Europe, but all over the globe. They would be found on
merchant ships and, later, dedicated warships. These broadside firing sailing vessels,
using “line ahead” tactics, came to dominate the seas. However, both fortifications and
fleets of warships cost vast sums of money. This is money that most European powers did
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not necessarily have on hand, which caused them to fight among themselves for “overseas” resources.
To reduce the costs of warfare, many of the nations of Europe experimented with
standardization in arms and equipment, with arms, at first, being procured, and later
produced, by armories owned by the state. They sought out technical innovations to make
their new, standardized armies even more deadly. These innovations included replacing
the “matchlock” with the flintlock ignition system, and replacing the pikes in their
armies, first with the plug bayonet (a dagger jammed into the barrel of the musket, which
precluded its use as a firearm), and later with the socket bayonet (which allowed the
infantryman to discharge his weapon and reload with the bayonet attached). 29
Roberts and Parker described the Military Revolution as the means by which the
European nation state came into being. Howard examines how it changed the military
aspects of European society. Another work examines the impact war had on European
society. In 1985, J. R. Hale published War and Society in Renaissance Europe. He starts
his examination in 1453, the last year of the Hundred Years’ War between England and
France, and the fall of Constantinople to the Ottomans. His narrative ends with the
Bohemian riot in 1618 that sparks the Thirty Years’ War. Like Parker and Roberts, Hale
focuses on the increase in the size of armies. He states that the central mystery, relating to
the wars of the period, was not, “why, but how enough men were found to fight them.” 30
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To answer this, Hale examines a military “reformation” in which portable artillery and
firearms radically effected the conduct and conditions of war. This is best summarized by
saying that better artillery led to better forts, which led to longer sieges, which extended
the campaigning season, which increased the overall cost of warfare for those involved.
As reliance on gunpowder weapons increased, firearms and gunpowder would need to be
procured and stockpiled, which further increased the cost of warfare, even in peace time.
These costs magnified exponentially when artillery was added to fortifications. All of this
led to a greater financial burden, which was passed on to the populace of the state by way
of taxes.
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Examples of matchlock and flintlock muskets -- Photo by the author

Hale echoes Roberts’ original military revolution thesis, but aligns himself with
Parker, seeing the origins of the military revolution beginning not with Maurice of
Orange, but instead with the tercios of the Army of Flanders. Like Howard, he
emphasizes the importance of Swiss contributions, but sees the Spanish combined-arms
model, paid for with looted New World silver, as being the first successful
implementation of the Military Revolution on a large scale. Like both Parker and

22
Roberts, he argues that professional, paid military service was necessary to lessen the
direct impact of war upon civilians, which he termed, an “unremitting molestation of
normal life”, which would only increase during the blood and horror of the French Wars
of Religion, and the Thirty Years’ War. 31
With these evolutions of Robert’s original idea of the Military Revolution in
place, Parker returned to the subject with his book, The Military Revolution: Military
Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500-1800. 32 In this work, he reiterates his initial
thesis concerning a military revolution, stating that in response to improvements in
artillery, the angled bastion fortification was developed. The angled bastion allowed for
this improved artillery to be used in a defensive role, further increasing military reliance
on firepower. This, in turn, created the need for larger armies, in order to crew more
guns, which would further increase the ancillary aspects of armies, as more materiel
(gunpowder, muskets, cannons, etc.) was needed to keep these men in the field. The
increase in the number of field armies up to the nineteenth century, he argues, is proof of
the correctness of his thesis.
But while Parker asserts that the validity of his thesis remained intact, others were
not so sure. Simon Adams takes issue with Parker on the topic of the growth of army
size. While both Roberts and Parker claim that army sizes ballooned as a result of the
Early Modern European Military Revolution, Adams argues that there was no real
difference between field army strengths from the sixteenth to the seventeenth centuries.
Unlike the previous authors who claim an increase in army size, he argues that the
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number of men under arms remained nearly static, stating that finding the total strength
of any particular state is problematic because the systems for record keeping were in their
infancy, and sometimes those records can be suspect. He further argues that if armies
grew during the period, the growth stems from political reasons, rather than technological
ones. He draws attention to the Hapsburgs, and their engagement in a series of defensive
wars, wars fought by isolating and reducing strongholds, which was a time consuming
and expensive process. He concludes by stating that “any final conclusions about the
military revolution must take its political context into account.” 33
And he makes a fair point. If Hapsburg armies increased it would be due to a
series of simultaneous wars. With this increase evident on the battlefields, their
antagonists would feel the need to have to increase the numbers of their forces as well.
This argument turns the focus from the tactical and technological reasons that Roberts
and Parker claim armies increased in size and shifts it towards the political situation at
the time, namely the struggle against Hapsburg hegemony. In this, Adams stands apart
from both Parker and Roberts. If one of the major aspects of their Early Modern
European Military Revolution is increased army size, which led to increased bureaucracy,
then Adams’ claims that army sizes stayed relatively static changes that.
Clifford Rogers, writing in 1993, while agreeing that there had been a military
revolution, differed with Parker on both scope and time frame. Instead of a single
revolution. Rogers argues for a series of evolutions over a longer period. Shifting away
from the Early Modern period, Rogers believes that, “the focus on the centuries after
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1500 obscures the importance of the period in which the most dramatic, most truly
revolutionary changes in European military affairs took place: the period, roughly, of the
Hundred Years War (1337-1453).” 34 This view is only fitting, as Rogers’ work focuses
on the Medieval period. While Parker does call attention to changes in medieval army
composition, he does it almost in passing. But to Rodgers this change is formative to the
military revolution.
Prior to this, in Europe, armies were comprised of feudal aristocrats fighting from
horseback, who sought to capture one another for ransom, not to kill. But he states that
“the armies which conquered Europe’s first global empires, on the other hand, differed
from this description on every single count.” 35 Not only were these new armies
comprised of common people, but they fought on foot, for pay, “in close-order linear
formations which relied on missile fire than shock action; and they fought to kill.” 36
What Rogers argues for is an “infantry revolution” taking place during the Hundred
Year’s War, which was followed by an “artillery revolution” as proposed by Parker, and
a revolution in the way war was administered, proposing an “alternative paradigm based
on the biological concept of ‘punctuated equilibrium evolution.’” 37
Rogers uses the infantry victories of Courtrai (1302), Bannockburn (1314), and
Morgarten (1315) to preface similar triumphs by the English over the French “using the
‘pike-and-shot’ combination of dismounted men-at-arms and archers which they
developed in the 1330s in Scotland.” 38 These tactics made the battlefields of Europe a
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decidedly deadlier place. He states that “war under the feudal regimes of Western Europe
in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries often seemed more like sport than serious business.
In the Flanders War of 1127, which involved about a thousand knights fighting for over a
year, only one died by the hand of an enemy; an equal proportion of the losses of the war
resulted from excessive horn-blowing.” 39 These tiny casualty figures have more to do
with aristocratic desires to capture and ransom their foes, than any other desire.
But if one of the stated purposes of medieval warfare was to gain funds through
ransom, non-aristocratic infantry “did not command large enough ransoms to make their
capture worthwhile. Nor did they share in the ‘fellowship in arms’ which bonded
chevaliers even of different nationalities. Quite the opposite: the class differences
between knight and bourgeois or peasant often encouraged extreme bloodthirstiness.” 40
In addition, pikes, halberds, billhooks, longbows, and crossbows were designed to kill at
distance, thus giving their relatively untrained wielders an advantage against their usually
mounted foes. 41 Rogers states that, “it is easy to see why the battlefields of the Infantry
Revolution became such bloody places … Ever since, Europeans have had an unusually
lethal approach to warfare.” 42 Rogers fails to report whether Europeans practiced the
same amount of restraint when fighting non-Europeans, or Europeans who failed to
follow orthodox religious practices.
According to Rogers, European lethality would increase with the technological

39

Ibid, 62.
Ibid.
41
Longbows are an exception here. It took a lifetime to become proficient with the longbow, with exhumed
longbowmen showing physical deformations incurred over a lifetime of practice. This investiture in time
would be one of the driving forces in the adoption of the firearm, even though the longbow was more
efficient weapon system.
42
Ibid.
40

26
advancements that heralded the advent of the Artillery Revolution. Prior to the 1415 siege
of Harfleur, gunpowder artillery had been used in concert with more traditional medieval
artillery (catapults, springalds, and trebuchets), but instead of being used against the
walls, “gunstones were fired into the town, where they knocked down houses and
churches.” 43 At Harfleur, the artillery made sizable breaches in the walls, forcing the
defenders to capitulate after relieving forces were nowhere to be found. By the 1430s,
this was becoming the norm, as “the powerful Burgundian artillery … could demolish the
walls of most fortifications.” 44
Cities that traditionally required long sieges to capture, fell quickly to the
concentrated firepower of French gunpowder artillery. Rogers states, “it seems fair to say
that a revolution occurred in the art of war around 1420-30s, as gunpowder artillery
overturned the centuries-old dominance of the defensive in siege warfare. What was the
nature of this revolution?” 45 To answer this, he describes technological advances in
cannon founding, cannon design, and improved loading techniques, as well as new
methods of gunpowder production. Further improvements included two-wheeled
carriages and cast-iron cannonballs.
The development of the hooped-staves method made it possible for even
the largest iron canon to have longer barrels, the adoption of which
increased accuracy, power, and rate of fire. The new iron refining process,
and the increased skills of the gunsmiths, made guns cheaper to buy; and
corned powder made them both more powerful and cheaper to use. The
number and size of guns in use increased rapidly. 46
Having presented his evidence for the Infantry and Artillery Revolutions, Rogers
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echoes Parker as to the importance of trace italianne fortifications, describing this as the
“Artillery Fortress Revolution.” 47 But, again, he attempts to distance himself from his
predecessors, stating that “we are, thus, dealing not with one revolutionary change, but
with a whole series of revolutions which synergistically combined to create Western
military superiority of the eighteenth century.” 48 This assertion that the Military
Revolution was the root of European military hegemony was a step further than either
Roberts or Parker were willing to go. And while this is a compelling argument, it fails to
account for the agency of those people who were on the receiving end of European
colonialism.
Both Roberts and Parker argue that “administrative, fiscal, and governmental
reforms” were necessary for the growth in the size of armies during the period. 49 Shifting
the chronological focus ever so slightly, John Lynn focuses on the social stability,
brought about by the long reign of Louis XIV as being the catalyst for increased army
size. This interpretation synchronizes with Simon Adams studies of the Hapsburgs. Since
the Hapsburgs increased their armies to meet a series of threats, France felt the need to
increase their armies, as they were surrounded by the Hapsburgs and their allies. By
focusing on Louis XIV, whose reign covered the latter half of the seventeenth century, he
aligns himself with Jeremy Black, who:
ascribes all French military growth to Louis XIV’s personal reign. The
fact that he shifts the time period away from Robert’s original dates is of
little consequence in itself, since others, including Parker, had done that
before. However, much more essential, Black insists that the military
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expansion occurring after 1660 came only as the consequence of increased
government capacity made possible by social and political compromises
hammered out under Louis XIV. Therefore, Black reads out the army and
war as causes of political change, and instead reduces them to mere
effects. 50
Thus, the idea of an Early Modern European Military Revolution, as put forth by
Roberts, and championed by Parker has been successfully challenged. Instead of a single
military revolution embodied by linear infantry tactics, there were multiple revolutions
(one could even call them evolutions) in how armies fought: an infantry revolution which
began with the mobilizing of peasants during the Hundred Years War, a gunpowder
artillery revolution which caused medieval fortresses to become obsolete almost
overnight, a fortress revolution which shifted the balance on the battlefield from attack
back to defense, and returned the siege to the dominant form of activity on the battlefields
of Europe, and a naval revolution (which lies outside the scope of this paper) that
projected military power around the globe. With each of these revolutions came a change
to the way rulers, and their armies, prosecuted warfare. These evolutionary changes, in
turn, necessitated new ways in which the nations of Europe were forced to govern.
Bureaucracy and taxation increased, which eventually paved the way for the
revolutionary period that marked the beginnings of Modern Europe.
But what if there was another military revolution? What if these incremental
changes paved the way for another and thoroughly more modern revolution, one that
could have (had it been fully realized) changed how wars were fought? My evidence will
show that this is the case. It consists of some of the technological factors focused on by
Parker, and places them within a later timeframe. This new revolution springs from the
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mind, actions, and written words of one man. This one individual is said to have “the
stage for a Military Enlightenment later in the century.” 51 His name was Sébastien le
Prestre de Vauban.
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CHAPTER TWO: THE MAN, THE MYTH, THE LEGEND
To discuss these ideas it necessitates a discussion of the man himself. How does a
seventeenth-century military engineer become the embodiment of the Early Modern
European Military Revolution? Among his many achievements, Vauban contributed three
things which are key to this discussion. The first invention was the socket bayonet, which
Vauban invented and introduced to the French army in 1668. His second was a
systematic approach to siege warfare, important because pitched battles were rare, while
sieges predominated the era. His final invention was an attempt to limit the cost of
warfare in both men and materiel. 52 By examining these three inventions, it will be
possible to gain a better understanding of how Vauban shaped, and contributed to an
Early Modern European Military Revolution.
Born in 1633, to a minor noble, Vauban was orphaned by the age of ten, and by
seventeen he was fighting alongside the rebels led by the Duc d’Orléans during the
Fronde of the Princes. Captured and rehabilitated (not executed for fighting against the
crown), Vauban fought for the rest of his life under the banner of the Sun King. By 1655,
he received a commission as a royal engineer, and by the time peace was declared in
1659, he had overseen, or participated in, ten sieges, being wounded several times. When
war broke out again in 1667, he successfully besieged Spanish garrisons in Douai,
Tournai, and Lille, which helped bring the War of Devolution to an end.
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As new territories came into the possession of France, Vauban was tasked with
rebuilding and revitalizing any existing fortifications. When war with the Netherlands
recommenced, Vauban reduced Rheinberg, Nijmegen, Maastricht, Trier, Bouchain,
Valenciennes, Cambrai, Ghent, and Ypres. In 1692, he besieged, and took the fortress of
Namur, which was defended by his Dutch counterpart Menno van Coehoorn. In 1697
Vauban took Ath, a town he had previously fortified. He died in 1707, and after his
remains were scattered during the Revolution, his heart was interred in the Hôtel des
Invalides on the orders of Napoleon I.
With his life given a cursory examination, it is time to look at the first of his
revolutionary inventions: the socket bayonet. Sharpened sticks are thought to have been
among the first human weapons. As metallurgical technology improved, the spear
became “the most important and most widely used offensive armament.” 53 This would
continue to be the case until well after the development of gunpowder weaponry. 54 As it
took a relatively long time to reload these early firearms, the infantry using them would
be quite vulnerable. To combat this, infantry armed with pikes, which are spears up to
sixteen feet long, were used to defend these musketeers from attacks by cavalry, as well
as other men with pikes. 55 Firearm technology advanced. First came the matchlock,
which used a piece of smoldering rope that plunged into an ignition pan of loose
gunpowder. Then came the wheellock, which consisted of a wheel, under tension, that
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when released created sparks that ignited gunpowder like a cigarette lighter. Finally came
the flintlock, an ignition system that consisted of an arm, called a dog, holding a flint that
falls forward and strikes a steel plate, causing sparks which ignites the gunpowder. With
these innovations in, place reload times decreased, thus lessening the need, but not
eliminating, the need of pikemen for defense. So long as cavalry remained an effective
tool on the battlefield, men with firearms would be vulnerable.
The first attempt to solve this vulnerability came in the form of the plug bayonet.
The plug bayonet was a dagger, the handle of which was designed to be jammed into the
barrel of the firearm, giving the soldier something sharp which with to defend himself.
The obvious shortcoming of this design is that it renders the firearm useless except as a
spear, the barrel being plugged by the bayonet. While this worked in extreme
circumstances, it did not outweigh the benefits that a firearm brings to the battlefield.
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Vauban designed and introduced a bayonet that, instead of being inserted into the
barrel of the firearm, slipped over the barrel, locking in place by means of a lug on the
barrel. This adaptation, introduced to the French Army in 1688, allowed the soldier to
discharge and reload his weapon with the bayonet attached. This subtle shift allowed each
infantryman the chance to use their firearms while maintaining the ability to defend
themselves. In addition, it allowed these infantrymen to advance, fire a volley, and
charge, which became the formula for battle for the next several centuries. It also
signaled the final demise of cavalry as the dominant power on the battlefield, although it
would take several centuries for the horse to be completely removed from the
battlefield. 56
Next in Vauban’s revolutionary toolbox came a systemization of siege warfare.
According to Christopher Duffy, prior to the career of Vauban, “the skill of military
architects placed the offensive at a relative disadvantage.” 57 This disadvantage only
became more apparent after the development of Vauban’s system. Prior to Vauban,
sieges were long, laborious, and expensive undertakings, sometimes with years passing
before either side capitulated. 58 During the medieval period, sieges could last years, as
stout castle walls could last as long as the food held out. This changed with the advent of
gunpowder artillery.
In 1494, “the French took a mere eight hours for the business of breaching the
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important frontier stronghold of Monte San Giovanni and massacring its garrison. The
place had once withstood a siege of seven years.” 59 Richard Holmes states “siege warfare
hinged upon the duel between engineer, who sought to make his fortifications
impregnable, and the gunner, who strove to batter them down.” 60 The engineers, having
seen their tall, stone fortifications quickly knocked down by gunpowder and cast-iron
shot, embarked on a new, angular building style.
First adopted in Italy, the trace italienne style of fortification, consisted of “low
defenses of earth, revetted with brick or stone, with deep ditches – which might
sometimes be flooded – shielding them from direct assault.” 61 The key feature of this
new style of defense was the angled bastion “an arrow-head shaped work that jutted out
from the line of the main curtain wall to enable guns mounted on it to cover the wall with
flanking fire … From the attacker's side little could be seen but a gentle slope, the glacis,
which fell away into a shallow walk-way protected by sharpened stakes.” 62 Further
impediments could be added, and all approaches would be subject to heavy fire from
defenders, possibly from multiple angles, making any attempt at forced entry a deadly
proposition. Thus, these early sieges were conducted via “a formless maze of saps and
redoubts, by which dangerously exposed parties of workmen dug their way towards the
fortress. The siege guns offered the men no very effective support, for the technology of
artillery design had made no progress since the 1490s, and nobody was sure where the
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batteries should best be sited.” 63
To this chaos, Vauban introduced order. An expanded description of his siege
techniques will be presented later, but the importance of order cannot be overstated, as
much has been made of the “intellectual context of the period, particularly Scientific
Revolutionary and Enlightenment predilections for geometry, Newtonian mechanics and
rationalism” 64 The difference between Vauban and his predecessors is best represented
by his two most vaunted achievements: the introduction of siege parallels and ricochet
shot. But both of these developments “were crucial in the first place for accelerating the
progress of sieges and making some parts of the fortifications much more vulnerable than
they had been previously. They are also indispensable for understanding the nature of
Vauban’s contributions.” 65
Before Vauban, besiegers “dug under fire a siege trench that snaked toward a
vulnerable part of a besieged fortification. Throwing up gabions and fascines before them
and building up earthworks as soon as they had dug a trench, sappers made a zig-zag
pattern on their way to the defensive perimeter.” 66 Under Vauban, “the original zig-zag
trenches now became merely communications trenches between a series (usually three)
of long trenches parallel to each other and concentric with the besieged fortress.” 67
Regarding the artillery, it could be placed in a number of different places, providing “a
wide arc of fire to batter the defenses, thus multiplying the potential points of attack.” 68
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Langins describes these parallel trenches as being “a kind of counter-fortress advancing
on a fortress.” 69
Duffy states that, “when we look back at on the state of fortress warfare in the
1640s and 1650s it is clear enough that without the determination of a single individual,
namely Vauban, who set out to remedy all the deficiencies he had observed, the French
would never have gone on to make their name as the greatest takers and builders of
fortresses in modern history.” 70 Describing this contribution to French siege practices,
Martha Pollack states:
Vauban was considered a theoretical, systematic, and machinating genius
… His tables of calculations gave the impression of strategic
unassailability; since he calculated not only the dimensions of every
element of the fortification, but also the length of time it would take … to
gain individual layers of the fortification, every stage of the siege could be
predicted in advance. Vauban reduced the defense and attack of fortresses
to double-entry bookkeeping, where the two columns balance each other
precisely. 71
The means by which fortified places were taken remained the same, but the difference lay
in the manner in which they were used; the most important of these were the blood and
sweat of the men laboring to take them.
In his treatment and concern for his fellow soldiers, laborers, and engineers
Vauban was at his most revolutionary. But to appreciate this, contemporary practices
must be examined. In 1695, an “ill-assorted army of Dutch, Spanish, English,
Brandenburgers, Hessians, and Hanoverians”, better known as the Grand Alliance,
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besieged the city of Namur, which had fallen to Vauban in 1692. 72 According to Duffy,
when the French attacked, “Vauban made sure on every occasion that the way was wellreconnoitered, that the battalions were thoroughly conversant with their tasks, and that
the troops had to cover only the shortest possible stretch of open ground before they
reached their objectives.” 73 Contrast that with how, on the 30th of August, 1695, a signal
was given for “the best battalions of the Allied army to climb out of the trenches and
advance against the citadel complex … they moved steadily across six hundred yards of
fire-swept ground with drums beating and colors flying.” 74 For their gallantry the Allies
suffered over two thousand casualties for no appreciable gain. To contrast, three years
earlier Vauban took the same city suffering less than three hundred casualties. But it was
not only military men and tactical thinkers who commented on Vauban’s concern for the
lives of his men.
Louis de Rouvroy, Duc de Saint-Simon, was a courtier at Versailles, who began
writing his memoirs in 1699. His collection of anecdotes and stories presents a view into
the colorful court life of Louis XIV. Among his remembrances, he includes a description
of Vauban. Unlike the more malicious entries Saint-Simon reserves for those he hates, he
paints Vauban in the best possible light, calling him “perhaps the most honorable and
upright man of his day … the simplest, truest, and most modest of men … never was a
man better natured, gentler, or more obliging.” 75 But most interesting is Saint-Simon’s
description of Vauban’s interaction with his men. He writes, “he was courteous without
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servility, almost miserly with the lives of his soldiers, and possessed the kind of valour
that bears every burden and lets others enjoy the credit.” 76
Being “miserly” with the lives of soldiers seems like a very late-twentieth century
notion. And for this Vauban’s ideas should rightly be seen as revolutionary. His invention
of the socket bayonet, which allowed infantry with firearms to defend themselves, his
system of siegecraft, including ricochet batteries, and parallel trenches, that reduced the
time and cost of sieges which were the dominant aspect of warfare at the time, are both
revolutionary in their approaches. And while both are evolutions of earlier technologies
and systems, they are revolutionary in the manner in which they were implemented. Both
of these can be seen as attempts to reduce casualties among French troops, while
increasing casualties among France’s enemies. All of these things, being taken together,
represent a revolution in the manner in which war was prosecuted during the Early
Modern period. But to prove this theory of revolution, an event in which the socket
bayonet, systematic siege craft, and attempts to limit the danger to the besiegers needs to
be found, and there can be no better example found than by examining Vauban at the
height of his craft.
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CHAPTER THREE: A SAMPLE OF HIS GREATNESS: ATH, 1697
Writing in 1887, E. M. Lloyd, a Major in the Royal Engineers, and late Professor
of Fortification at the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich mused that while
improvements in weaponry and tactics changed the nature of siege warfare, “the
principles which Vauban was the first to grasp, and which his rules embodied, remain as
applicable as ever.” 77 Ostwald states that, “with over forty sieges to his credit, Vauban’s
followers could have chosen other sieges to emphasize. But several reasons converged to
focus attention on the 1697 siege of Ath. First, given the importance of Vauban’s legacy
to the engineering community, a capstone of his career was only appropriate to show him
at the zenith of his art.” 78 The account of the siege of Ath offered Vauban’s disciples “the
opportunity to illustrate a fundamental tenet of military engineering, the desire to
constantly improve the efficiency of siegecraft.” 79 And one of the best ways to study
Vauban’s methods was to study his words.
Written after his formal retirement from military service, for the rising generation
of French military engineers, A Manual of Siegecraft and Fortification represents the
culmination of Vauban’s military accomplishments. Written almost a decade after the
siege of Ath, he states, that by employing his method, “you will spare three fourths of the
people you are accustomed to lose in such an enterprise; you will avoid much useless
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expense; you will make all your efforts with greater assurance of success; you will
advance just as rapidly as if you went at it precipitately; and, finally, you cannot help but
succeed, whereas at present we usually fail.” 80 While much ink has been spilled by
historians and biographers concerning Vauban’s life and the fortifications he designed
and built along the frontiers of France, A Manual of Siegecraft and Fortification contains
nothing in regards to his fortifications, and precious little in the way of describing how to
conduct a defense. The majority of the text, instead, attempts to codify the most efficient
way to force a fortified position to surrender. So, while Vauban is primarily known as
being a military architect (twelve of his fortifications have been designated UNESCO
World Heritage sites), he should be remembered, not only for being a superbly talented
engineer, but as a masterful practitioner of the art of war. 81 This assertion reinforces the
claims of Vauban’s biographers, who identify his most important contribution to the art
of siegecraft as being “his systematization of the siege attack”, and they declare him
“responsible for another radical shift from defensive dominance to offensive
supremacy” 82
Vauban begins by instructing his reader that “the first fault in the conduct of
sieges is the violation of secrecy.” 83 Foreshadowing the “loose lips sink ships” motto
from the Second World War, he says, “nothing is more important than secrecy; but also
nothing is more difficult to achieve because of the nature of the men to whom a general is
forced to communicate his plans in order to have their advice and the necessary
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material.” 84 He exhorts his reader to “plant false rumors to the effect that a siege of some
other place is intended, in order to occupy the gossips who infest every army and whose
guesses are sometimes more accurate than you might wish.” 85
Once the decision to attack a particular place has been made, Vauban implores his
reader to “personally make a full circuit of the invested position, reconnoitering the
surrounding countryside and especially the directions from which a relieving force is
most to be feared, posting strong guards in those quarters.” 86 According to Louis Goulon,
who provides the best known description of the siege of Ath, on the 18th of May, 1697,
“the Marshals Villeroy and Catinat, with Monsieur de Vauban and other general Officers
went and reconnoitered the Ground on the side of the Abbey of Cambron.” 87
Befitting a work intended to be read by military engineers, Vauban continues by
saying that a chief engineer should, “acquaint himself with positions which might give
him some advantage, for he must try to profit as much as possible from the terrain … to
do this well they should have an accurate map of the position, on which they should mark
any changes that seem to have been made since it was drawn.” 88 He concludes by stating,
“if you want your map to be the best possible, it is a good idea to take along someone
from the area who can give you the names of the chief landmarks that you will see.” 89
Vauban designed the fortifications around Ath, overseeing their construction from 1668
to 1674, giving him an intimate knowledge of the defenses.
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Once the terrain has been scouted and the besiegers have taken up their positions,
Vauban describes the next three things the besiegers need do. First, they must “wrest
every possible advantage from the terrain, leaving the enemy only those positions from
which he cannot be dislodged.” 90 Next, they “must not allow the inner side of the camp to
lie within cannon range of the fortress” which could lead to undue casualties among the
besiegers. 91 But at the same time Vauban states, the besiegers “must take care not to
move the camp too far away lest he occupy more ground than is necessary and find
himself inconvenienced by over-extended lines.” 92 This is done to “shut the enemy up as
closely as possible in the fortress so that they cannot pass beyond their outer
fortifications, if he has not already been so bottled up during the investment.” 93
“Bottling up” the enemy is advantageous for several reasons. First, it denies them
“forage or the wood found around the fortress.” 94 It will be much more difficult for them
to receive aid. Plus, it will make it much more difficult for “spies or individuals who slip
past the camp to get into the fortress, and by the same token more difficult for those on
the inside to get out.” 95 This will allow the besieging engineers the opportunity to
perform their own reconnaissance in relative safety.
Vauban states that any besieged position “should be reconnoitered from time to
time and studied as closely as possible.” 96 And while he encourages the commanding
general and his staff to participate, he is emphatic that it is “the engineers who should
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especially study how to demolish both the strong and weak points of the fortress, since
this kind of knowledge is their province.” 97 The engineers are exhorted to “draw an exact
map … They cannot be too meticulous in marking in details and in clearly showing the
houses, bridges, screening terrain, hollows, marshes, rivers, streams, and rocks that they
observe.” 98 This map gives those in charge the information they need in order to put
together their plan of attack. Goulon reports that on the 21st of May, “Monsieur de
Vauban, who had his Plan of Attack ready formed, and had very frequently before
reconnoitered the Ground, went thither again with Monsieur de Catinat, and a few
Ingineers, who advanced pretty near the Place, under favor of the dark of the evening.” 99
Vauban writes that while the general gives orders, the engineers need to “show
him alternative plans of the works, explaining the strengths and weaknesses of each and
offering estimates of the construction time needed in each case.” 100 Later in his book,
Vauban claims four days to invest (surround) the fortress, nine days from the opening of
the first trench to the beginning of the attack on the covered way (the small step behind
the glacis that proves a firing position for the defenders in front of the ditch which
protects the fortress), four days to capture the covered way, and on and on until the
besieged are forced to capitulate. 101 Only after a plan of attack has been agreed upon, can
the engineers begin construction of the siege lines.
These lines comprise several parts. Between the line and the besiegers is a ditch.
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Behind the ditch is a parapet, or low wall, from which musketeers can receive some
cover. This is backed by a palisade, or fence, constructed of sharpened sticks. To this are
added strong points, or redans which are “V-shaped protrusions of the line with the point
of the V extending in the direction from which attack is expected”, 102 which include the
all-important artillery batteries. Vauban states that “the artillery of the army is normally
placed in the redans. The guns should be able to lay a flanking fire along the length of the
line and should be placed on raised platforms so that they may fire across the parapet
without the need of embrasures.” 103 These are not the heavy siege guns that are used to
knock holes in the enemies’ walls, (those will be organized into batteries at various
places along the lines) but smaller field artillery used in the event of a sortie by the
besieged. Once these first lines are completed, the engineers begin opening the first of
three parallel trenches. As the name suggests, these trenches run parallel to the besieged
fortification, allowing the attackers to move in relative safety, unobserved by the
besieged.
Vauban warns that after everything has been prepared for beginning these
trenches “you must exert every effort to be certain that the enemy does not suspect your
intention.” 104 To accomplish this, he recommends opening the trenches at night because
“daylight is extremely favorable to those defending the lines, while darkness aids the
attackers.” 105 At Ath, the trenches “were opened accordingly at Seven in the evening in
two Places on the side of the Gate of Brussels, a shower of Rain falling very opportunely,
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Figure 2

The final stage of the 1697 siege of Ath – Illustration by Lillian Green
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which made the night very dark.” 106 In order to make it more difficult for this work to be
discovered, the engineers were to warn the workmen “to be silent, to lie down on their
fascines, not to start working until they are so ordered.” 107 Additionally, “the chief
engineer should be present … and must revisit it after an hour to make certain that
everyone is doing his duty and that the plans are well executed. Each night he must do
more or less the same thing, for it is his responsibility to place the workmen in position –
or at least the first ones.” 108 Goulon reports that Vauban “visited the Trenches constantly
twice every morning to inspect and examine the Work of the night before, in order to see
what was further to be done.” 109
With the first parallel trench opened, the engineers begin to snake their way
towards the fortifications, using saps. Vauban describes saps as “a sort of sunken path or
trench by means of which one advances towards the enemy works.” 110 This forward
movement allow the besiegers to bring forward men and material in relative safety.
Christopher Duffy states that at Ath, Vauban opened the first trench “at a distance of 650700 paces from the covered way on the eastern side of Ath. This was followed on the
night of the 24-25th by the digging of the second parallel, three hundred paces from the
fortress.” 111 Before Vauban, heavy artillery batteries were routinely placed in the first
parallel. But Vauban, “being of the opinion that Batteries at so great a distance only serve
to imbolden the Enemy, and burn Powder to no purpose”, set up his first artillery battery
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in the closer second parallel. 112
It is important to note, that these batteries were not used primarily for the purpose
of knocking the walls down. Instead, they were expected to disable the defenders’
artillery. To facilitate this, Vauban proposed a new way of handling the artillery. Goulon
reports that “it was not without difficulty, that Monsieur de Vauban prevailed upon the
Officers of the Train to lower the Charges of their Great Guns to batter a ricochet with
small Charges, the effects of which did not presently appear to them.” 113 According to
Duffy, “in order to deliver this kind of fire the gun barrels were elevated by anything
from three to fifteen degrees, and the powder charges were varied by an ounce at a time
until the gunners arrived at the weight which caused the shots to graze over the top of the
fortress parapets and bound along the length of the terrepleins behind.” 114 Goulon states
that “it is necessary to observe, that these Ricochett Batteries must always be placed on
the right or left of the Attacks, in order to infilade and fire upon the reverse of the
Cover’d Ways, and other Works.” 115 Jamel Ostwald, describing the siege of Ath claims
that, “the results of Vauban’s ricochet fire was evident when they captured the town’s
covered way on the night of the 29th. … Less than two days of ricochet fire from thirtysix cannon had forced the defending soldiers to abandon it entirely.” 116 Goulon notes,
“We found, after the place was taken, that the greatest part of the wounded had their Legs
and Arms carried away upon the Rampart by the effects of these Batteries, the bullets
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giving the Enemy incessant disquiet on all sides, following ‘em even into their safe
Retreats, dismounting their Guns, by breaking the Wheels and Cheeks of the
Carriages.” 117 While these new ricochet batteries, by themselves, have the potential to
cause terrible casualties among the defenders, they did not guarantee an easy conclusion
to the siege. More would be needed to force the besieged to surrender.
Once the enemy guns are either knocked out of action, or greatly reduced in
number, the besiegers are free to push forward another set of saps, and begin work on the
third and final parallel, which Vauban calls the “forward assembly area.” 118 He laments,
“of all the obstacles that the necessity of defense has invented to resist the besieger’s
attack, I know of nothing more difficult to surmount than the outer edge of the ditch – the
counterscarp. Whether you take it at the first attempt or not, the effort is certain to entail
heavy losses – especially if you fail, which happens all too often.” 119 He continues, by
stating that, “this loss is always a result of excessive haste; we do not take half the
precautions demanded by such an enterprise, and consequently instead of gaining a day
we lose two – at the cost of our best troops who perish miserably on such occasions.” 120
This is in part because the counterscarp is completely exposed to fire from the main
rampart of the fortification, cannons located in embrasures in the escarpment, as well as
any of the other outer works which have not yet been cleared. In order to undertake a
successful assault, he recommends “two lieutenants, each with four sergeants, six
grenadiers, and thirty riflemen, to go after the two faces of the angle. I do not send squads
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under sergeants ahead of them, for being small parties they can be cut up terribly by the
least accident; and this only terrifies their comrades who are often frightened enough
already by the imminence of danger.” 121 The first detachments should number at least
fifty men, with each subsequent detachment containing two hundred men and “as many
grenadiers as possible.” 122 Before going in, Vauban recommends that all the batteries
“begin the bombardment of the counterscarp five or six hours before the assault to
occupy the defense and break down the palisades here and there, leaving gaps. If you
have been careful to position the batteries well, they will not fail to cause great disorder,
and if you have any explosive shell use it upon the areas of the glacis where you intend to
make your assault.” 123 But, more important than everything else is “a brave example is
most necessary to keep courage high, for ordinarily the enemy resists vigorously and
willingly takes advantage of any hesitation or confusion to return to the counterscarp.” 124
Goulon reports that on the night of the 1-2nd of June, “the Cannon Batteries being
now establish’d before the Faces of the Bastions, they began to batter in Breach. There
were Six twenty-four Pounders before each Bastion, and four more at each Return of the
Parapet of the Cover’d Way, which were opposite to the Flanks of those Faces, and began
to batter them.” 125 These cannon, placed in batteries very close to the fortification were
used very differently than the ricochet batteries. He states, “as the business was now to
fire with full Charges, and strait before ‘em, the Gunners were in the Center, only they
were ordered to cut the Wall in a direct Line about six Feet above the surface of the
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Water, all the Points of which Line, being struck together at the same time, soon
produced the desired effect.” 126 This repeated firing will eventually cause a breach. And
causing a breach is the penultimate aim of the siege. Goulon continues, saying “Our Guns
continuing to fire the evening and night following, and all the day afterwards, the
Breaches were made to satisfaction.” 127
Vauban writes that, “after a breach has been enlarged and made accessible, you
can attempt to establish a foothold upon the bastion … From there you can slip along the
edges of the right and left faces until you are in a position where you can force the
abandonment of any retrenchments – which does not take long.” 128 With any
retrenchments cleared, he states, “you should mount your cannon and attempt to secure
all possible advantages of fire power against the defenses … This is the time to make the
strongest efforts, to pound the defenses, to break down the palisades, and attack the
enemy vigorously, unless he forestalls his loss by surrendering the fortress, which is still
in position to make an honorable capitulation.” 129
Goulon reports that at two in the afternoon, on the 5th of June, twenty companies
of grenadiers prepared to attack the breech “confidently assured he should carry the Place
by Assault. When they got to the Foot of the Breach, a Cry was heard amongst our Men,
That the Enemy were coming out upon the Breach … Whilst this was doing, a poor
frightened Drummer was beating the Chamade very softly in the Center of the Bastion,
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not daring to venture upon the Rampart.” 130 And with that the siege of Ath was over,
“one of the strongest places in Europe, was taken without farther Loss than about fifty
private Men … and about one hundred and fifty more wounded.” 131 Goulon continues,
stating that “No Siege was ever carry’d on with so little Loss or Expense.” 132 As if to
push home Goulon’s point, Ostwald describes the siege of Ath as “the epitome of
Louisquatorzian siegecraft.” 133 And while this is a beautiful turn of phrase (and quite a
mouthful), it does not convey the beauty (if one can attest beauty to death and
destruction) of Vauban’s siege method. Vauban, as if describing his seizure of Ath,
states, that “There is no fortress to which this method is not applicable.” 134 His record
would be would prove him correct, as he conducted more than forty successful sieges
during his career, only being rebuffed twice, and both of those times only because he was
ordered to withdraw before the siege could be successfully concluded.
Were Vauban’s methods always followed? No. But as E. M. Lloyd said, “the
principles which Vauban was the first to grasp, and which his rules embodied, remain as
applicable as ever.” 135 These methods included: maintaining secrecy as to the intended
target, personally reconnoitering the target to insure the more correct information,
attempting to gain all advantages provided by the terrain, closing the enemy off from any
reinforcements, prosecuting the siege in an orderly manner, and most importantly
knowing that haste wakes waste. And when these methods were followed success was
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almost always assured. Among those who were France’s principle antagonists in Europe
at the time, the Dutch and English, the example of Menno van Coehoorn, who advocated
for a furious bombardment followed by an equally furious assault, trying to take positions
by storm regardless of the cost in human lives, was the vogue.
But European warfare was never ending. Once the Dutch had been humbled by
the combined might of France and England, the English, ruled by a Dutch prince,
William of Orange, would later, under the German Georgian kings, serve as a foil to
France during the rest of the eighteenth century. In 1754, this struggle would expand
beyond Europe, to the forests and islands of North America, where the fate of that
continent would hang in the balance. 136
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CHAPTER FOUR: ULTIMA RATIO REGNUM
In 1754, Virginia militia, under the command of a young George Washington,
accompanied by a contingent of Mingo Indians, ambushed, killed, and captured a group
of French-Canadian militia along the banks of the Monongahela River. This action, and
Washington’s subsequent capture, helped to spark a worldwide conflict that would
change the balance of power in Europe, strengthen Britain’s influence in India and North
America, and subsequently lead to political revolution, in the Americas and France. And
by all accounts, the fighting in North America was not revolutionary. While certain
aspects of the art of war as practiced by Native Americans were present, the majority of
fighting took place between Europeans, fighting in the European style. This is important
to illustrate whether, fifty years after his death, Vauban’s military revolution had been
implemented, and if this implementation was ultimately effective. To do this, the sieges
of Fort William Henry (1757), Fort Carillion (1758, 1759), and Fort Niagara (1759) will
be examined in much the same way as the Siege of Ath.
The art of the siege as practiced by Vauban can be distilled into six simple steps:
Maintain some Secrecy
Do Some Reconnaissance
Gain All the Advantage of Terrain
Bottle the Enemy: Not too Close, Not too Far
Prosecute the Siege in an Orderly Fashion
Slow and Steady Wins the Race (Haste Makes Waste)
Following the victory over Baron Dieskau and his French forces at the Battle of
Lake George (1755), Sir William Johnson, Superintendent of Indian Affairs,
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commissioned a fortress be built at the southern end of Lake George, to serve as an
advanced base of operations, as well as to guard the southern route to Albany. This fort,
named William Henry, was designed and built under the direction of William Eyre, a
captain in the Royal Engineers. It was a timber structure, constructed with four bastions,
with a glacis and ditch, that could accommodate up to three hundred men, while
additional forces maintained a fortified campsite on higher ground five hundred yards to
the east.
In March of 1757, a combined French, Canadian, and Native force of over 1,500
men, armed with scaling ladders, attempted to seize the position, unsuccessfully. Louis
Antoine de Bougainville, writing in his journal states, “such was the end of this
expedition; they burned the enemy’s three hundred bateaux, four vessels, two
storehouses, and left one other to which they believed too exposed to burn … One must
hope that this loss will delay the operations of the enemy.” 137 In August of that same
year, Louis-Joseph de Montcalm-Gozon, marquis de Montcalm de Saint-Véran, gathered
more than 8,000 men at nearby Fort Carillion, in order succeed where the previous
expedition had failed.
A word about Montcalm. Before being tasked by king Louis XV with defending
New France, he fought with distinction in the Wars of Polish and Austrian Successions.
During the War of Polish Succession, he served at the sieges of Kehl and Phillipsburg
under Claude-François Bidal, marquis d’Asfeld. D’Asfeld was a disciple of Vauban’s
who would later be marshal of France and head of the Department of Fortifications, chief
over the entirety of the French engineering corps. It can be assumed that any knowledge
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gained during these sieges would have been infused with the example of Vauban. It is
therefore very likely Montcalm would have had access to Vauban’s texts, and he would
have had ample time to study these during these sieges. 138
As per Vauban’s recommendations, Montcalm reconnoitered the area around Fort
William Henry. While Vauban recommended that a commander “should detach a large
body of cavalry with all the mounted infantry in his army” to blockade a fortress. 139
However, cavalry was of limited use in the densely forested, and mountainous terrain of
the North American frontier of the mid-eighteenth century. But Montcalm had a
contingent of 1799 Native Americans from various nations, of whom Bougainville states,
“it is necessary to inform them of all the plans, to consult with them, and often to follow
what they propose. In the midst of the woods of America one can no more do without
them than without cavalry in open country.” In addition, as both Fort Carillion, and Fort
William Henry lay near to large, navigable lakes, experience directed using those lakes as
means of transporting men and materiel more quickly and more easily than trying to
cover the same distance on foot through dense, forested, mountainous terrain. And while
this would tend to lessen the element of surprise, the strategic targets offered to each side
were rather obvious.
On the third day of August, Montcalm surrounded Fort William Henry, and the
adjacent fortified camp. Bougainville writes, “the Chevalier de Lévis arrived and took a
position on the road from Lydius … the body of the army formed the rest of the
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investment … the position the advance guard held, although the best possible for cutting

Figure 3
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off communications, was not a battle position and was too far away from the siege, the
provisions, and other supplies.” 140
At three in the afternoon that first day, Montcalm exhibited one of Vauban’s
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revolutionary ideas: he “notified the commander of the fort that humanity obliged him to
warn him that once our batteries were in place and the cannon fired, perhaps there would
not be time, nor would it be in our power to restrain the cruelties of a mob of Indians of
so many different nations.” 141 The desire to spare the lives of his own men being a
hallmark of Vauban’s revolutionary thinking, thus Montcalm can be credited with trying
to spare the lives of his men, by employing “the Art of Fighting without Fighting.” 142
The next day Montcalm, “having decided to open the trenches this same night,
went with the engineers and the artillery officers to reconnoiter the area where the attack
was to be made and to look for battery positions.” 143 This action fulfills Vauban’s second
step, which is to make reconnaissance. At the same time, Montcalm attempted to “bottle
the enemy” ordering a large part of the army, including all of his Native American
warriors, to “cover the right side of the army, to send scouts on the road to Lydius, to
watch the enemy on this side, and to make them believe, by continuous movements in
this area, that we occupied all this line of communication, for it was quite impossible to
invest the whole place.” 144
Once this was accomplished, it was time for Montcalm and his subordinates to
make their plan of attack. Bougainville states, “it was decided to make the attack from the
north and to emplace two batteries, one to work directly against the north bastion, and the
other to cross its fire onto the same front, both at the same time to deliver ricochet fire on
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the defenses.” 145 This decision to use “ricochet fire” shows another of Vauban’s legacies
was still in use fifty years after his death.
Bougainville writes, concerning the next step in Vauban’s siege method:
This afternoon a large number of workers have been employed in …
opening the trench at 350 toises from the fort, and at starting a parallel, the
two protected batteries, and the communication of this parallel with the
batteries. They took full advantage of the terrain and overcame the
difficulties that the fallen trees and stumps which covered it presented.
The work advanced well, and by day break was under cover everywhere
except at the right battery ... They also got twelve cannons ashore at the
depot, as well as a few mortars and the necessary munitions. 146
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North Bastion of the recreation of Fort William Henry – Photo by the
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With the trenches opened, Bougainville notes that the besieged garrison
was “two thousand men and consequently strong enough to make sorties.” 147 To
make it more difficult for those sorties, and since the woods around the fort were
thick, Bougainville states that, “we camped close enough to the trenches to be
able to support them. However, since the troops in this position were much
bothered by the enemy’s fire, and some were killed in their tents by cannon balls
and bombs, the Marquis de Montcalm had the camp … pulled back.” 148 And
while Vauban claims that “using many workmen” to dig trenches “could make a
considerable advance the first night with few losses”, he never states how many
“many” is. 149 Bougainville writes in his journal that, “a thousand workers
employed this night in the trenches finished the left battery, hauled the guns there,
finished the communication trench to the right battery and very much advanced
the work on this battery.” 150
With open trenches, and the initial batteries in place, Montcalm had the elements
in place to “prosecute the siege in an orderly fashion.” Bougainville begins his journal
entries for the 6th and 7th of August by describing how the two batteries, which consisted
of twenty cannon, howitzers, and mortars fired “either along or at an angle, on the
defenses fronting on the lake … and by ricochet on the entrenched camp.” 151 While the
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artillery fired, “the workers continued the trench started the previous night, which they
carried to within about one hundred toises of the fort. They also started at the end of this
trench another parallel for a battery and for musket men who will fire at the parapets on
the front being attacked.” 152 And for the next two days the French artillery battered the
defenders constantly. But before the breaching batteries could be established, or any
assault on the fortress could be conducted, a letter was intercepted by the French from
General Daniel Webb to Colonel George Munro, informing the commander of Fort
William Henry, that he would be unable to relieve him and to “obtain the best terms he
could.” 153 On the morning of August 9th, “the fort raised the white flag and asked to
capitulate.” 154
The ease with which Montcalm captured Fort William Henry, a position which
was “certainly not impregnable, but neither was it to be easily brushed aside”
demonstrates the power of Vauban’s siege technique. 155 And while it can be argued that
the defenders of William Henry were hampered by old artillery, almost all of which
ruptured from over use during the siege, and they were at a numerical disadvantage, the
French outnumbering them three to one, the only thing that could have saved Fort
William Henry was intervention. But here too, this argument is ineffectual, as the forces
available to Webb were numerically inferior to Montcalm, and had his relief of the fort
failed, then the road to Albany, and victory in New York, would have been assured. Thus,
this action at Fort William Henry exemplifies the Early Modern Military Revolution. It
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shows the dominance of gunpowder artillery, the durability of trace italianne
fortifications (even when they are built of lumber and earth), and the effectiveness of
siegecraft as practiced by Vauban and his scions.
Having shown that maintaining secrecy as to the intended target, personally
reconnoitering the target, using the terrain to the best advantage, closing the enemy off
from any reinforcements, prosecuting the siege in an orderly manner, and most
importantly taking ones time to gain a more harmonious outcome successfully caused
North America fortifications to be taken, it is necessary to demonstrate what could
happen when they were not. As the campaign season of 1758 began, the English set out
to take the key to Lake Champlain and the water route north: Fort Carillon, a place the
Mohawk people called Ticonderoga.
When Montcalm approached Fort William Henry along Lake George, he used his
Native American auxiliaries to feign an attack on Fort Edward and Albany. The British
commander in 1758, Major General James Abercromby, had no force capable of
misleading the French as to his ultimate goal. Montcalm conducted his reconnaissance of
Fort William Henry in person, but Abercromby entrusted the scouting of his objective to
Major Roberts Rogers, the leader of Rogers’ Rangers, a famous band of woodsmen who
had spent the previous winter fighting the French in the mountains between Fort Carillion
and Fort Saint Frédéric. And while Rogers might have had well-deserved reputation as a
frontiersman and warrior, he was not an engineer.
On the morning of July 5th, Abercromby and approximately fifteen thousand
British regulars and colonial militia boarded boats and began the arduous pull up Lake
George. In the vanguard were Rogers, Abercromby’s deputy commander, brigadier
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general George Augustus, viscount Howe, and the 80th Regiment of Light-Armed Foot,
commanded by lieutenant colonel Thomas Gage, who would later serve as the military
governor of Massachusetts, his actions there starting the American Revolution. The
French were able to observe the movements of the British unopposed along the lakeshore.
Up to this point, Abercromby had failed to follow any of Vauban’s admonitions,
and this would ultimately lead to a crushing defeat. Firstly, he failed to keep his target a
secret. As early as March 24th, Bougainville, who spent the winter in Montreal, noted in
his journal that the British were concentrating forces in Albany, and that these forces
could only be directed towards Fort Carillion. Second, he failed to conduct a personal
reconnaissance, Abercromby had his subordinates do it. Third, and in this instance most
importantly, he failed to make the best use of the terrain. Walter Borneman suggests that
Abercromby’s deputy, Lord Howe “should have ordered the entire army to follow Rogers
along the route he had previously reconnoitered and close with Fort Carillion as quickly
as possible.” 156 But instead of bringing the entire army, Howe advanced with the 80th and
some of Rogers’ Rangers, blundering into a French advanced force. In the ensuing
firefight, the French were driven off, but at the cost of Lord Howe and any element of
surprise. Bougainville noted, “His death stopped the advance. The disheartened English
gave us twenty-four hours’ delay, and this precious time was the saving of us and of the
colony.” 157
The next day saw the French construct a fortified position, “made of tree trunks,
lying one on top of the other, and having in front overturned trees whose cut and
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sharpened branches gave the effect of chevaux-de-frise.” 158 Nursing a wound back at
Lake George, William Eyre, the first commandant of Fort William Henry, described the
scene to his friend Robert Napier:
But I fancy’d you might Ask how it came about that I was not employ’d or
conselted before the Attack of the intrenchmt was made, as you know I
have been Generally in time of Service employ’d in that Branch of the
Service, however the Attack was made, I am Sorry to Say not in the most
Regular Manner … Unhappy for us we presently found it a most
Formidable Intrenchmt & not to be forc’d by the Method we were Upon.
for upwards of one hundred Yards in front of it, Trees were fell down in
Such Manner it Broke our Battalions before we got to the Breastwork … I
was of opinion we should attack it in Column, each Regt picking one, or
two to Support each Other, As we could more easily force Our Way thro’
the fell Trees than by making so large A Front, but it was said this would
cause confusion: in short, it was said, we must Attack Any Way, and not
be losing time in talking or consulting how. Attack we did, but it’s hard to
describe which way … Great faults are found with the Method of the
attack and little knowledge we had of the Strength of the Enemys Works,
& the Sudden Retreat to this Ground … I believe we may have lost near
Two thousand Men kill’d And Wounded, I fancy about fifteen or Sixteen
hundred of them Regulars … I forgot to inform You that we had part of
Our Artillery not far from the Rear of the Attack, but no use was made of
them either before or after. 159
Again, Abercromby had failed to heed Vauban. And even if he was ignorant of
Vauban’s teachings, William Eyre was not. And he makes it clear he was not consulted
as to how the attack should be conducted. Bougainville recorded his own impressions of
the battle:
The different attacks, almost all afternoon and almost everywhere, were
made with the greatest vigor. … This column, composed of English
grenadiers and Scottish Highlanders, returned unceasingly to the attack,
without becoming discouraged or broken, and several got themselves
killed within fifteen paces of our abatis. … At seven o’clock the enemy
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thought only of retreat, covered by the fire of the light troops, which kept
up until dark. 160

Picture 4

Remnants of Montcalm’s redoubt – Photo by the author

Each example of Abercromby’s failure validates Vauban: “you will spare three
fourths of the people you are accustomed to lose in such an enterprise; you will avoid
much useless expense; you will make all your efforts with greater assurance of success;
you will advance just as rapidly as if you went at it precipitately; and, finally, you cannot
help but succeed, whereas at present we usually fail.” 161 Abercromby failed to keep his
target a secret, relied on the reconnaissance of others, fought the French on the ground of
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their choosing while failing to make use of all the resources at his disposal, and did so in
such apparent haste that he failed to even consult with the one trained officer of engineers
on his staff.
However, since Vauban was French, and Abercromby was English, is it possible
that he had never heard of these techniques and as such cannot be faulted for failing to
follow them? The answer is no. Were he trying to follow van Coehoorn’s example, he
would have used his artillery, yet Eyre reports that the artillery was not involved. Further
proof of the superiority of Vauban’s techniques comes from the actions of General
Jeffery Amherst a year later when he took Fort Carillion with far less trouble.
Unlike Abercromby, Amherst had conducted a successful siege in Vauban’s style,
conquering Louisbourg, the Gibraltar of North America, just weeks after the disastrous
attack on Fort Carillion. Amherst’s victory at Louisbourg typifies how France lost the
Seven Years War in North America. Louisbourg was the strongest, most modern
fortification in North America. But its location, isolated on Île-Royale (present day Cape
Breton Island), made relief and resupply difficult. When a British force, under Lord
Loudoun, attacked in 1757, they were unable to land troops, and were driven off by a
combination of a strong French naval presence and a hurricane. Later, in response to
British maneuvers directed against their sugar-producing colonies in the Caribbean,
France removed most of their fleet from Louisbourg, leaving only a token naval force of
four “ships of the line” to guard the most strategic harbor in French possession, and
subsequently the mouth to the Saint Lawrence river. This allowed the Royal Navy the
room to land troops and subsequently cut out and burn the remaining ships, leaving
Louisbourg on its own.
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Even more disastrous for the French defenders than the loss of their naval support
was their lack of provisions. Bougainville, throughout his journal, bemoans the state of
the food supply available in New France. Even in cities like Montreal and Quebec there
were shortages, and on Île-Royale they were entirely reliant on imports from France to
survive. With the Royal Navy blockading the harbor, the defenders of the greatest
fortress in North America were doomed, even if Amherst had not employed Vauban’s
siege techniques. But a silver lining could be found for the French in their defeat. The
time the British expended reducing Louisbourg prevented them from launching an attack
on Quebec that year, and instead they spent the rest of the campaigning season taking the
French settlements in what is today Newfoundland, New Brunswick, and Prince Edward
Island. 162
With the 1759 campaigning season in the planning stage, Amherst put forth a bold
plan to Prime Minister William Pitt: simultaneous attacks against Fort Carillion, Fort
Niagara, and Quebec. This three-prong approach would help to keep the French off
balance, not allowing them to focus on any one target, fulfilling Vauban’s first
requirement of maintaining secrecy. In March, he sent Rogers with some of his rangers, a
detachment of light infantry, and Native auxiliaries to map, not only the defenses of
Carillion, but also the surrounding countryside, so when it came time to make his move
against the fort, he could use that map to find a suitable place to carry out his own
reconnaissance. On the morning of July 23rd, from the top of Rattlesnake Hill (now
named Mount Defiance), Amherst enjoyed an unobstructed view into the fortress and set
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about dispatching part of his artillery to fire upon the defenses. This fire allowed him the
opportunity to simultaneously start his own trenches, thus using the terrain to his
advantage, prosecuting the siege in an orderly fashion, while attempting to bottle up the
enemy.

Picture 5

Fort Ticonderoga as viewed from Mount Defiance – Photo by the
author

Once Amherst’s artillery was in place, and the English and colonial forces
pushing their trenches up on to the old Carillion battlefield, Brigadier General FrançoisCharles de Bourlamaque found his position untenable. Under the cover of a furious
artillery barrage, he retreated north to Fort Saint Frédéric and before leaving, he set
charges in Carillion’s powder magazine. After the dust settled, Amherst was in
possession of the fort. The English had lost five dead, with thirty one wounded, a casualty
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count that would have made Vauban proud.
Now that Carillion was in British hands, the French saw their position in Fort
Saint Frédéric as untenble. Seperated by thirty miles, Saint Frédéric defended a narrow
passage on Lake Champlain, serving a similar function to Carillion. With walls twelve
feet thick and up to four stories tall, with cannon embrasures on each floor, it was an
imposing position, placed right on the lake shore. This proximity to the lake, while

Picture 6

The remnants of Fort Saint Frédéric – Photo by the author

advantageous to controlling maritime traffic, would prove a hinderance to its defense.
The height of its walls, while advantageous for defending against attacks made without
the benefit of artillery, became a serious liability and an obvious target for British
artillerymen. Even without having to sap and advance, the British would be able to turn
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the fortress to rubble in short order. Having seen how efficently Amherst had reduced
Carillion, the French decided to abandon Fort Saint Frédéric. And like at Fort Carillion,
they set charges in its powder magazine.
Thus, by following Vauban’s methods, Amherst captured two fortifications, with
minimal casualties on his side. He would build Fort Crown Point on a site adjacent to the
ruin of Fort Saint Frédéric before beginning his trek towards Montreal, a move that
would end the fighting in North America the next year. But these maneuvers were only
one piece of the three-pronged attack designed to crush the forces of France in North
America. The next position that needed to fall would be the recently improved Fort
Niagara.
Amherst’s choice to lead the attack on Fort Niagara was John Prideaux, “colonel
of the Fifty-fifth Regiment on the death of Lord Howe and who with this new command
assumed the rank of brigadier general in North America.” 163 According to Borneman, “he
was also discreet. As Prideaux assembled some 3,000 regulars, including the Forty-fourth
and Forty-sixth regiments, a battalion of Royal Americans, and a company of Royal
Artillery, and led them west up the Mohawk, secrecy was Amherst’s sternest charge.” 164
Again, Vauban’s injunction to maintain uncertintanty amongst the enemy concerning the
intended target of an attack would pay dividends for the British, if they could keep their
target a secret. In order to achieve this secrecy, Prideaux needed a strong screening force,
to keep prying eyes away from his camp, as well as to bolster his force. Enter Sir William
Johnson and a thousand warriors from the various nations that made up the Iroquois
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Confederacy. On July 6th, Prideaux landed forces three miles from the fort, while others
made their way overland, effectively circumvallating Fort Niagara, and bottling up the
enemy.
As the fortress commands the headland where the Niagara River empties into
Lake Ontario, Prideaux sent several barges filled with men to reconnoiter the fort.
Captain Pierre Pouchot, the commander of the French garrison at Fort Niagara states in
his memoir, “We allowed them to group together and come in close. As soon as we saw
they did not wish to come any closer, we fired cannon at them, which made them put
back into the lake again.” 165 While this occurred, the Engineers were “to attend and
regulate the place of breaking ground before the fort.” 166 Prideaux can be seen following
Vauban’s methods to the letter, being methodical in his preparation, and thorough in his
execution.
On the 10th, an anonymous French officer, whose journal was among the items
siezed after Fort Niagara’s fall states that “at 2 o’Clock all our Men were on the
Ramparts, and at Day-break we percieved they had opened their Trenches, at the entrance
of the Wilderness, at about 300 Toises from the Fort; we made a very hot fire upon them
all day.” 167 Despite the continuous fire from the French artillery, the British continued to
advance their trenches. By noon, on the 11th, “a party of about 15 Men, Soldiers and
Militia, went very nigh to the Trenches of the Enemy, and percieved them sally out
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between 4 and 500, who came towards them at a quick Pace, but they were stop’ed by
our Cannon … at 5 0’Clock they began to play two Granadoe Royal Mortars.” 168 William
Johnson later related to John Stanwix, that “we Carried on our Approaches with little or
no loss and opened two Batterys the 11th: one of which did no great Execution by reason
of its great distance.” 169 This is the only black mark against Prideaux, thus far, this
situating of the first battery too distant to be effective. A careful reading of Vauban states
that he was “of the opinion that Batteries at so great a distance only serve to imbolden the
Enemy, and burn Powder to no purpose”. 170
Had Prideaux not been following Vauban’s method, if his planning, and
organization had been found wanting, then the disasterous events of the 20th would have
put the entire operation in jeopardy. Vauban councelled that, “whatever care you may
take to construct your trenches carefully, there is never any place in them where you are
completely safe from all hazards. You are incessantly exposed to the ricochet of the balls
which most often – only raking the top of the parapet without being stopped – fall into
the trench killing and maiming many poor devils.” 171 Early in the evening of the 20th,
General Prideaux and his aide-de-camp, Colonel John Johnstone, were inspecting the
forward trenches when what Vauban warned about occurred. Johnstone was pierced by a
French musketball, killing him instantly. Prideaux helped carry the body back to the rear
and continued his inspection. Pausing to watch his men fire off one of the mortars, it
misfired, the shell exploding prematurely, destroying the piece, taking Prideaux with it.

168

Ibid, 507-508.
The Papers of Sir William Johnson, Vol. X, ed. Milton W. Hamilton, (Albany: University of the State of
New York, 1951), 112.
170
Goulon, Memoirs of Monsieur Goulon, 102.
171
Vauban, Manual of Siegecraft and Fortification, 96.
169

72
When word of Prideaux’s death reached the fort, the anonymous journaler recorded, “We
have Room to hope, that with such Succours we may oblige the Enemy to raise the Siege,
with the Loss of Men; and as they take up much Ground, they must be beat, not being
able to rally quickly enough.” 172 And had Prideaux been more like Abercromby, that
might have been the case.
The next morning, Sir William Johnson stated he was “determined to persevere in
the same just and vigorous maners, which was carried on by the Deceased General”
hoping that the troops would “exert themselves to the utmost and act with the same
laudable spirit which they have hitherto shown.” 173 With this determination to stay the
course, the only way for the French to relieve Niagara would be to drive off the British.
To this end, François-Marie Le Marchand de Lignery, the hero of the Monongahela,
marched at the head of a relief force and arrived in the environs of Niagara on the 23rd.
On the 24th, they met men under the command of Colonel Eyre Massey, who stood
behind an abatis reminiscent of that employed by Montcalm at Carillion.
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Figure 4

Illustration by Lillian Green

When the smoke cleared, the defeat was total, with only around one hundred of
the French surviving to be taken prisioner. Lignery succumbed to his wounds a few days
later. Pouchot continued to resist for a bit longer, but after another inspection of the
fortress, the precariousness of the defense was evident.
All these considerations made the officers of the garrison ask M. Pouchot
to consent to a capitulation. Up to that point he had said nothing. He
begged these gentlemen to consider whether there might be any other
course of action. They pointed out to him the exhaustion of the garrison,
which had not slept for 19 days & had been continuously under arms or
reparing the works. They also claimed that a delay of two or even eight
days, even were that possible, could not save the place & could only lead
to the pointless loss of even more brave men, more especially as no
reinforcements could be hoped for from any quarter. 174
Pouchot formally surrendered Fort Niagara to Sir William Johnson on the 25th of
July, 1759, opening “a vast void in New France from the forks of the Ohio almost to the
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gates of Montreal.” 175 Only Quebec remained defiant, and that defiance would cease after
a sixty-eight day bombardement, preceded by a battle on the Plains of Abraham which
saw both the Marquis de Montcalm and General Wolfe killed.
While there may be many reasons France lost the war in North America, the fall
of New France hinged firmly on the successful implementation of the siege techniques
espoused by Vauban. By maintaining operational secrecy, conducting reconnaissance to
gain first-hand knowledge of the nature of their targets, utilizing all of the advantages
provided by the terrain, denying the besieged enemy reinforcements, maintaining their
sieges in an orderly manner, and prudently taking their time, commanders on both sides
of the Seven Years War in North America were able to reduce and seize fortified
positions. British victories at Louisbourg, Fort Carillion, Fort Saint Frédéric, and Fort
Niagara coupled with the French victory at Fort William Henry prove the effectiveness of
Vauban’s methods. And the inverse is true. Had Abercromby emulated Vauban and used
the terrain to his full advantage, like Amherst did, had he placed cannons on Mount
Defiance, there would have been no need to conduct the many costly, and ultimatly
disasterous frontal attacks against the heavily entrenched French lines. These attacks
wasted the lives of his men, bolstered French morale, and ultimately prolonged the war in
North America by at least another year, taking even more lives on both sides.
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CONCLUSION
For all that has been written about Vauban’s ingenuity on the offensive, much less
has been said about his views on defense. This is, in part, because of how rarely Vauban
conducted defensive actions. But it is also, in the words of George A. Rothrock, because
“it was in the attack that he showed the scope of his genius and inventiveness.” 176 When
Vauban was given the opportunity to conduct a siege according to his principles, he was
successful. Where does that leave the defenders then? Are they simply doomed to fail, or
are there ways and means by which they can successfully defend against Vauban’s
methods?
The short answer is no, for if Vauban’s methods are followed, any fortress will
fall, given the strategies, technologies, and army organization of the era. Only twice
during his military career did Vauban fail to take the fortification he was tasked with. He
states, “you would be wrong to believe that with all the secrets of the art, and all the
advantages of nature you could make a place impregnable; they can all be taken by an
enemy who combines strength and resolution.” 177 But, in knowing that defeat in
inevitable, he recognizes that the purpose of a fortified place is to stall the enemy, to keep
them there, as compared to them being someplace else. This would require the defenders
to continue to fight, retreating behind new defenses each time the attackers advance.
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Vauban writes that “of all retrenchments the best, in my opinion, is the small bastion built
within the bastion under attack. It is that much more advantageous if it forms a second
wall, which having more or less the same defenses can be held in the same way.” 178 But,
according to Vauban, the governor of a fortress, having been, “reduced to abandoning his
bastions and retrenchments, he can retire within new positions he has prepared within the
fortress itself.” 179
These new positions would require the attackers to, essentially, begin the siege
again, but now within the confines of the fortress, forcing them to “advance foot by foot
from retrenchment to retrenchment until there is no longer room enough to throw up
others against him.” 180 This would allow the governor to claim that he had fought as long
and as hard as was possible, without being forced to fight to the proverbial “last man.”
Vauban concludes his discussion of defense by saying that, “after such extremities it is
certain that the governor will not be allowed the surrender that could not have been
refused him had he been willing to treat earlier; but however he leaves the fortress he will
bear all the laurels that may be won.” 181 Montcalm’s sally at Quebec, that cumulated in
the Battle of the Plains of Abraham, was predicated on this idea. With the British in a
position to besiege Quebec, and no relief available, Montcalm must have felt that was his
only option to stall defeat. 182
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This commitment to be frugal with the lives of his men is the most revolutionary
aspect of Vauban’s military revolution. This is in part due to military tradition. With
regards to a military aristocracy, Langins states, “The adjective ‘military’ would have
been a pleonasm during the Middle Ages, when nearly all nobles were soldiers. In an
influential book that appeared a few years later, the chevalier d’Arcq argued that the true
nobility, and the mainstay of the monarchial state, was the military nobility.” 183 But with
the advent of the absolutist state came a new interpretation of what it meant to be a noble.
Unlike Menno van Coehoorn’s family who enjoyed a long and storied military tradition,
Vauban’s family were elevated to the nobility through a combination of financial
contributions to the crown, and governmental service as notaries and clerks.
This “nobility of the robe” would not have had expectations of glory on the
battlefield. Instead, their loyalty and expectations would have been to the apparatus of the
state, with the protection of the state and its resources being their highest priority. This
explains why Vauban was so “miserly with the lives of his soldiers” as everyone, from
the common laborer to the most experienced marshal of France, was an irreplaceable
resource that should only be expended when no other option was available. This is in
stark contrast to military tradition which holds martial glory as more important than
casualties. Again, a comparison between Vauban and van Coehoorn is apt. Casualties
were of secondary concern to van Coehoorn, as long as the objective was met, whereas
Vauban, as has been mentioned, did everything he could to reduce casualties among his
men, a paragon of “efficiency”.
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But as bayonets replaced pikes, and as sieges have been part of the Western
Tradition since Joshua went to Jericho and Agamemnon camped outside of Troy, what,
then, is the lasting impact of Vauban’s military revolution? Ostwald points out that even
before his death in 1707, Vauban’s methods, while effective, were not terribly popular
among certain circles, especially field commanders such as John Churchill, 1st Duke of
Marlborough. While the effectiveness of Vauban’s methods are evident, field
commanders argued that there was little glory to be won in the plodding, regularity of the
siege.
Using the past as their guide, these men praised the battles of Alexander and
Hannibal, seeing war of maneuver as being the pinnacle of their art. The military career
of Napoleon best exemplifies this. A skilled artillerist before gaining command,
Napoleon sought decisive battle. He rarely conducted sieges, except during his campaign
against the Ottomans, who refused to meet his armies in the field. During the same
period, British commanders in Spain, hampered by the nature of the French occupation,
conducted several successful sieges, including taking the city of Badajoz but only after
sustaining very heavy casualties in a series of costly frontal assaults.
By examining battles fought during the eighteenth, nineteenth, and even into the
very early twentieth centuries, a pattern emerges around the use of the bayonet. During a
typical battle, the artillery opened fire at long range as the infantry closes. When optimum
distance was reached, the infantry on both sides would engage each other. It was at this
point, after the infantry had given and received volleys of musket fire, that one side
would see that their opponent was wavering and order their infantry to charge. This
motion, the sudden rushing forward of men with gleaming steel intent on murder, would
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often be enough to break the enemy line, and the victorious commander would order the
cavalry to pursue the defeated. One can assume that the men who died under
Abercromby’s command, died with bayonets attached to the barrels of their muskets.
This pattern would continue even after technological advances had made the
bayonet charge a suicidal proposition. This is in part due to tradition. The bayonet had
replaced the pike, and the pike was the favored weapon of Hannibal and Alexander.
There is also a psychological aspect to using the bayonet. During the American Civil
War, many battles involved at least one bayonet charge, and most of these resulted in
terrible casualties on the attacking side with no appreciable gain.
But in the instances where they were successful, they were often the difference
between victory and defeat. In 1916, as part of the preparations for an all-out offensive
against the German lines along the River Somme, British High Command began a
preliminary bombardment on June 24th. At the appointed hour, on July 1st, the British
threw themselves at the German lines, bayonets fixed, with all the ferocity their
antecedents displayed at Badajoz. And much to the same conclusion. Why? Because
there was the possibility, like on the Plains of Abraham, where one volley and a bayonet
charge could win the day. And if the battle was a bloody one, all the brighter the laurels
for the victor.
According to Jean-Denis G.G. Lepage “Vauban was a man-at-arms who did not
like violence.” 184 His development of the socket bayonet changed the way armies were
fielded on the battlefield. By giving every man with a musket the ability to defend
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himself against cavalry, it allowed the entirety of the infantry greater flexibility to
perform, while giving commanders a powerful offensive weapon, which became central
to offensive tactical thinking well into the twentieth century. And while the invention of
high explosives increased the killing power of the artillery, it did not fundamentally
change the way in which it was employed. Advances in gun design might have made the
“ricochet battery” obsolete, but the principles upon which it operated, are now universally
recognized as “counter-battery fire.” The French gunners who pounded Fort William
Henry would have recognized how the British artillerymen firing on the Somme were
trying to crack open the German positions, even though they would not have been
familiar with how the artillery operated.
Vauban’s siege techniques were designed to limit casualties among the besiegers,
which is the most revolutionary aspect of his Military Revolution. This was rare among
his contemporaries. Vauban was willing to extend a siege in order not to needlessly
expend lives. His chief antagonist, the Dutch maestro Menno van Coehoorn, is noted for
having been willing to risk the success of a siege on one massive artillery barrage,
followed up by an equally massive infantry attack. These failed as often as they
succeeded, often incurring huge numbers of casualties. But when successful, the glory
heaped on the victors more than made up for the casualties, at least in the eyes of the
commanders involved. And where the Dutch found allies, namely Britian, Prussia, and
whoever else was fighting France at the moment, van Coehoorn’s bloody, decisive
methods found traction.
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This “cult of vigor” as described by Ostwald, led commanders to reject sieges in
favor of battle in the field, a much bloodier proposition for all involved. 185 He writes,
“excessive safety and industrie were to be eschewed while speed and action were to take
their place: the engineering cult of efficiency was opposed by the generals’ cult of
vigor.” 186 And it will ultimately be the generals who will rule the day. It has been proven
that Vauban’s system saved lives, and could be counted on to produce victory, but
Ostwald states that, “many generals were willing to pay this additional price if they
believed it would expedite the siege. Vauban could rail against the inefficiencies and
argue that his method saved lives and time, but such counterfactuals were impossible to
prove to impatient commanders.” 187
While the socket bayonet would continue to be a feature of the battlefield until
well into the present day, and variations of Vauban’s siege techniques were practiced
until the advent of airpower made static fortifications obsolete, his drive to be thrifty with
the lives of the men under his command would not last. If bayonets were designed to
keep the infantry safe from cavalry, and parallel trenches, ricochet batteries, and a
systematic approach to the siege were intended to keep men safe then this means,
ultimately, Vauban’s revolution failed. 188 If he had hoped that his methods would save
lives, he was mistaken. That most famous of French generals, Napoleon, who certainly
studied Vauban at the École Militaire, squandered his armies time and again, finally
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throwing away his “Old Guard” at Waterloo. 189 Ostwald notes, that “many generals
supplemented efficient tactics with brute force, tactics which suited their wide-ranging
belief in the importance of vigorous action. The resulting amalgam of techniques were
enough to force towns to submit, yet the results were unsatisfactory for both sides. ” 190 A
perfect example of this is Abercromby’s attack on Carillion. And while the fighting
between England and France during the Seven Years War in North America revolved
around the reduction of fortified places, the fighting was ultimately decided by a pitched
battle, decided by one musket volley and a bayonet charge. Bougainville laments in his
journal that “the campaign did not end as happily as it began; it cost us Quebec, Carillion,
St. Frédéric, Niagara, Frontenac, and the Marquis de Montcalm. The general was killed at
the battle lost on September 13 before Quebec, and the colony was brought to bay.” 191
Twenty-three years later the French would have their revenge. Thirteen of the
British colonies in North America rebelled and declared their independence. They had
captured Fort Crown Point and Fort Ticonderoga, stripping them of their cannon which
were used to drive the British from Boston. After many years of fighting, it became clear
that the British forces in Virginia needed to be evacuated, as they had maneuvered
themselves into an unfavorable position. They soon found themselves under siege at a
place called Yorktown. With the Americans and their French allies employing Vauban’s
methods the besieged Cornwallis knew that their salvation rested in relief by the Royal
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Navy. On the 5th of September 1781, the Royal Navy clashed with La Marine Royale in
the Chesapeake Bay. The action was indecisive, but the British were forced to withdraw,
leaving the French free to land supplies, reinforcements, and most importantly heavy
siege artillery. Cornwallis surrendered on October 19th to George Washington, the
Virginian who led the incursion into the Ohio River valley that had been the spark that
lost them New France.
But what does all this mean for the debate surrounding the Early Modern
European Military Revolution? Roberts’ original idea, that this revolution began with
Dutch efforts to integrate Roman military techniques which ultimately helped to create
the modern nation state has been cast into doubt. Parker’s interpretation borders on
technological determinism and is therefore suspect. Jeremy Black almost argues against
the idea of an Early Modern European Military Revolution, stating, “Technological,
economic and social constraints gravely qualify any notion of an early modern European
military revolution.” 192 But what it really means is that there are many more things to
research.
The name of Early Modern European Military Revolution focuses on a specific
place and time. The name would suggest that there might have been a non-European
Military Revolution during the Early Modern period. One such avenue of study could
focus on the influence of the Ottomans on European military thought and actions, as
Vauban is rumored to have been inspired by Ottoman siege works. In addition, Mughal
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India, as well as China, and areas of South Asia are under-represented areas in the field of
military history, especially with regards to how those cultures influenced Europeans.
And while John Lynn has written about how women dealt with, participated in,
and were integral to warfare during the Early Modern period, his work represents a
fraction of the stories to tell. In addition, while much has been written concerning
military architecture, very little is written about those who were compelled to dig the
ditches, open the trenches, fill the gabions, and haul the fascines to make these sieges
happen. Vauban’s siege techniques were designed to keep those people safe, and
hopefully their stories will one day be told.
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